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I. INTRODUCTION
The public trust doctrine is complicated-there are fifty-one
public trust doctrines in this country alone;1 timely-the judicial,
legislative and scholarly work on the doctrine is proceeding apace;
and arcane-the roots of the public trust doctrine go back liter-
* Moses Lasky Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. My
thanks to Ralph Johnson, Richard Collins, Michael Blumm, and James Huffman
for their comments on this manuscript. I give special gratitude to my research
assistants, Richard Poulin and Julia Hosford Barnes, for their hard and perceptive
work. I dedicate this Article to Tom and Audrey Simmons, who personify the
ideal of citizen public service. Copyright 0 1989 by Charles F. Wilkinson.
1. The federal public trust doctrine announced in Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illi-
nois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), and the varying, state-law based trust doctrines total 51
separate public trust doctrines. See infra notes 164-75 and accompanying text.
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ally for millennia.2 But those factors do not explain why the pub-
lic trust doctrine is one of the most controversial developments in
modern American law, and perhaps the single most controversial
development in natural resources law.'
There are two basic reasons for the intense debate over the
trust. First, the traditional public trust doctrine deals with our
coastlines, harbors, and major rivers and lakes, which as a group
are among our most valuable natural resources, whether valued in
terms of economics, recreation, beauty, or spirituality.4 Second,
the debate evidences, at its quick, a collision between two trea-
sured sets of expectancy interests: those of private landowners
who expect their titles to land and water to remain secure, and
those of the general public, which expects that most of its rivers
will remain rivers, its lakes lakes, and its bays bays.'
The public trust doctrine comes in many different forms.' To
understand the trust, however, it is important to begin with its
core, what I refer to as the traditional doctrine. By the traditional
2. See infra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
3. The volume of controversy attending the modern development of the pub-
lic trust doctrine is suggested by the prominence of the seminal piece on the doc-
trine, Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judi-
cial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970) [hereinafter Sax, Judicial
Intervention]. Professor Sax's article was ranked among the 49 most frequently
cited law review articles of the previous 40 years in 1985. Shapiro, The Most-Cited
Law Review Articles, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1540, 1551-53 (1985). See also the "spate of
law review commentators" cited in Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property
and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71
IOWA L. REV. 631, 643 n.75, 644 n.76 (1986) (citing 27 law review articles on the
public trust doctrine).
4. See infra notes 27-58 and accompanying text.
5. On the role of the public trust doctrine in fulfilling public expectancy in-
terests, see Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical
Shackles, 14 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 185 (1980), quoted infra note 192 [hereinafter
Sax, Liberating].
6. The public trust doctrine derives from constitutional, statutory, and com-
mon-law sources, and has been applied in various contexts to resources other than
watercourses navigable for the purposes of title, including wildlife, federal public
lands, and drinking water. See, e.g., Note, Constitutional Law and the Environ-
ment: Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Environmental Control Commission, 59
TUL. L. REV. 1557, 1558-60 (1985). A wide range of trust purposes also have been
recognized, from the traditional navigation, commerce, and fishing uses estab-
lished in Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892), to the more ex-
pansive purposes recognized in the modern cases. See infra notes 165-75 and ac-
companying text.
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doctrine, I mean the trust principles that the United States Su-
preme Court 7 has applied to those watercourses that are naviga-
ble for the purposes of title'-those watercourses whose shore-
lines, beds, and banks pass by implication to states at the time of
statehood." Those natural resources were the subject of such lead-
ing nineteenth century cases as Shively v. Bowlby'0 and Illinois
Central Railroad v. Illinois.1 Different courts have since ex-
tended the public trust doctrine to many other kinds of re-
sources, 2 but first I want to focus on these particular resources
and the traditional doctrine that governs them."3
7. The traditional public trust doctrine appears in United States Supreme
Court cases as early as the 1840s and 1850s, see infra note 9, and in several recent
cases during the 1970s and 1980s, see infra note 145. The Court's clearest state-
ment of the trust, however, remains Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 435, 452-53.
8. Navigability-for-title is both a rule of real property and a question of fed-
eral law. The concept applies to those watercourses that are "navigable in
fact"-those watercourses used, or capable of being used, for navigation in their
ordinary condition at the time of statehood. See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10
Wall.) 557, 563 (1870), quoted infra note 95; see also, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988); Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States,
482 U.S. 193 (1987); Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1971); United States
v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935); United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931); United
States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926); The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
430, 441-42 (1874), quoted infra note 95. The Court's test for navigability-for-title
is summarized in Johnson & Austin, Recreational Rights and Titles to Beds on
Western Lakes and Streams, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 24-25 (1967). Other uses of
the term "navigability" are discussed in id. at 4-5.
9. The rule controlling ownership of shorelines, beds and banks of navigable-
for-title watercourses was stated in Martin v. Waddell, with reference to the origi-
nal 13 states:
when the Revolution took place, the people of each state became them-
selves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their
navigable waters and the soils under them for their own cormmon use, sub-
ject only to the rights since surrendered by the Constitution to the general
government.
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842). This rule was applied to subsequent states via
the constitutional equal footing doctrine in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3
How.) 212, 229 (1845). "The new states have the same rights, sovereignty, and
jurisdiction over this subject ['the shores of navigable waters, and the soils under
them'] as the original states." Id. at 230. See also infra text accompanying notes
81-89.
10. 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
11. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 164-73.
13. It is critical to distinguish those watercourses navigable for title and those
waters-nearly all waters of the nation, really-that are subject to Congress' so-
1989]
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Thus, my purpose in this Article is to search out the ori-
gins-the headwaters-of the public trust doctrine. In doing so,
my real attempt is to explore the fundamental legitimacy of the
doctrine. Does the trust have a solid base in history and public
policy?"' Does the trust emanate from the federal constitution,
federal common law, state constitutions, or state common law?'
5
Is the trust properly invoked in western water law, effectively
serving as a counterweight to the prior appropriation doctrine?"
Ultimately, is it appropriate and legitimate for the judiciary to
take a lead role in developing this doctrine in a time when natural
resources law has become heavily statutory? 7
II. THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN MAJOR WATERCOURSES
A great many countries have legal rules that, in one fashion
or another, give special treatment to major bodies of water. Typi-
cally, these rules articulate public concern for the resources and,
called "navigability" power under the commerce clause. In the early years of the
republic, federal regulatory authority was described in terms of navigability but
the reach of Congress' commerce clause power expanded dramatically after 1937.
See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). In time, the courts recognized that Congress' ability
to legislate over the nation's waters was essentially unlimited. See, e.g., United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985). There has been no
corresponding expansion of the navigability-for-title concept, which generally ap-
plies only to major watercourses. See supra note 8. Chief Justice Rehnquist has
accurately distinguished between the two doctrines:
Reference to the navigability of a waterway adds little if anything to
the breadth of Congress' regulatory power over interstate commerce. It has
long been settled that Congress has extensive authority over this Nation's
waters under the Commerce Clause. Early in our history this Court held
that the power to regulate commerce necessarily includes power over navi-
gation ... [but] a wide spectrum of economic activities "affect" interstate
commerce and thus are susceptible of congressional regulation under the
Commerce Clause irrespective of whether navigation, or, indeed, water, is
involved. The cases that discuss Congress' paramount authority to regulate
waters used in interstate commerce are consequently best understood when
viewed in terms of more traditional Commerce Clause analysis than by ref-
erence to whether the stream in fact is capable of supporting navigation or
may be characterized as "navigable water of the United States."
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 173-74 (1979).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 18-58.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 118-63.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 186-92.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 176-92.
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typically, these disparate concepts have ancient roots. Public val-
ues in water can be traced back, for example, to the Roman Insti-
tutes of Justinian's and the Magna Carta 19-often cited as his-
torical antecedents for the public trust2 0-and to medieval
Spain"1 and France.2 But these ideas extended far beyond Eu-
rope. In the Orient, recognition of public uses of water existed
well before the birth of Christ. 3 African nations held similar tra-
ditions: "from time immemorial the people of Nigeria have en-
joyed the right to fish the sea, with its creeks and arms and navi-
gable rivers within the tides."2 4 In Moslem countries, "the
fundamentals of Islamic water law purport to ensure to all mem-
bers of the Moslem community the availability of water. 2 5 Span-
ish and Mexican laws and institutions in the New World evinced
a powerful tradition that large portions of the water supply must
18. J. INST., 2.1.1-2.1.6 at 55 (P. Birks & G. McLeod trans. 1987) ("The things
which are naturally everybody's are: air, flowing water, the sea, and the sea-
shore.").
19. Magna Carta reissue, 1225, chapter 23.
20. See, e.g., 4 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 99 n.53 (1970); Lazarus,
supra note 3, at 633-35; Sax, Liberating, supra note 5; Comment, The Public
Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J.
762, 763-68 (1970).
21. LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, the thirteenth century codification of King Alfonso
X of Iberia, is cited as a Spanish antecedent for the public trust doctrine. See,
e.g., M. MEYER, WATER IN THE HISPANIC SOUTHWEST 106-09 (1984) (LAS SIETE PAR-
TIDAS "became a major source of Spanish law and indeed formed the basis for
much of the legal system later to be introduced in the New World."). See also
Lazarus, supra note 3, at 634.
22. An lth century statement of regional French law is cited by Professor
Sax as a proper source for the modern public trust doctrine. " '[The public high-
ways and byways, running water and springs, meadows, pastures, forest, heaths
and rocks ... are not to be held by lords.... nor are they to be maintained ... in
any other way than that their people may always be able to use them.' " Sax,
Liberating, supra note 5, at 189 (citing M. BLOCH, FRENCH RURAL HISTORY 183
(1966)).
23. U.N. ECONOMIC COMM'N FOR ASIA & THE FAR EAST, WATER LEGISLATION IN
ASIA & THE FAR EAST, at 210, U.N. Sales No. E.69.11.F.6 (1968) [hereinafter U.N.
ECONOMIC COMM'N]. Under the earliest Chinese water laws, first codified under the
Ch'in dynasty (249-207 B.C.), "private water ownership never appeared and the
individual duties in water undertakings would eventually lead to and enhance
public welfare." Id.
24. T. ELIAS, NIGERIAN LAND LAW 48 (1971) (citation omitted). Elias also re-
lates that "[aill the inhabitants of Nigeria also enjoy a right of free navigation in
tidal and other large inland waterways." Id. at 49.
25. U.N. ECONOMIC COMM'N, supra note 23, at 211.
19891
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
be dedicated to the community good.2
This general and nearly universal notion-the reluctance to
allow our great watercourses to be subject to wholesale private
acquisition-goes back even further on this continent, for most
American Indian cultures wholly denied the possibility of owner-
ship of land, air, and water. Tecumseh, the Shawnee Chief, asked
rhetorically, "Sell the earth? Why not sell the air, the clouds, the
great sea?"'2 7 Frank Tenorio, Governor of the San Felipe Pueblo,
spoke of the community values and spirituality that Indian peo-
ple traditionally have associated with water:
There has been a lot said about the sacredness of our land
which is our body; and the values of our culture which is our soul;
but water is the blood of our tribes, and if its life-giving flow is
stopped, or it is polluted, all else will die and the many thousands
of years of our communal existence will come to an end.28
The English, whose common law is the most direct source of
our public trust doctrine, saw ownership differently than did
American Indian people and generally favored private ownership
of natural resources. But the British made an exception for navi-
gable waterways.2 9 The common law distinguished between the
26. See, e.g., M. MEYER, WATER IN THE HIsPANIC SOUTHWEST 117-19 (1984).
27. Quoted in J. HUGHES, AMERICAN INDIAN ECOLOGY 63 (1983). On Indian
perceptions of ownership of water and other natural resources, see generally id. at
61-64 (Indians "had no concept of land as a salable commodity subject to exclu-
sive private ownership."); S. UDALL, THE QUIET CRISIS AND THE NEXT GENERATIONS
4-8 (1988) ("The land and the Indians were bound together by the ties of kinship
and nature, rather than by an understanding of property ownership .... The idea
that land could be bought and sold was an alien concept to the Indians of
America."); MEYER, supra note 26, at 18 ("From what is known of American In-
dian ownership patterns, it seems unlikely that water was considered private
property to be bought or sold or traded. Its centripetal position in Indian religion
reinforces this hypothesis."); Vecsey, American Indian Environmental Religions,
in AMERICAN INDIAN ENVIRONMENTS 1-30 (C. Vecsey & R. Venables eds. 1980).
Compare United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 69
(1913), in which the Court stated that "[o]wnership of a private stream wholly
upon the lands of an individual is conceivable; but that the running water in a
great navigable stream is capable of private ownership is inconceivable." This lan-
guage was cited with approval in United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S.
222, 226 (1956).
28. AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, INC., INDIAN WATER POLICY
IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 2 (1982).
29. One authority summarized the public uses of river beds and banks in
[Vol. 19:425
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jus privatum, which the Crown could transfer to individuals in
fee ownership, and the jus publicum,0 which the Crown held in
trust for the public.3 The most important areas of these public
rights were the coasts and those stretches of rivers affected by the
ebb and flow of the tide.
The real headwaters of the public trust doctrine, then, arise
in rivulets from all reaches of the basin that holds the societies of
the world. These things were articulated in different ways in dif-
ferent times by different peoples. In some cases the waters ran
deep, in other places the waters ran shallow. But the idea of a
high public value in water seems to have existed in most places in
some fashion.
Public values in water certainly existed in America at the
time of its founding. Indeed, it is hard to overstate the impor-
tance of the major watercourses during the formative years of the
United States. To the early settlers, the rivers furnished paths of
exploration and avenues for the fur trade 2 and log floats.3" Due
England in the following terms,
by the time of Sir Matthew Hale in the seventeenth century, the legal pre-
sumption was that the riparian owners along fresh-water rivers had the ex-
clusive right to the use of the beds and banks. But that presumption was
subject to a public right to use the bed and banks for purposes incidental to
navigation where the public had acquired that right by prescription or cus-
tom. The beds and banks of navigable rivers were indeed used by the pub-
lic, as a matter of right, for anchoring, mooring, and towing vessels along
the banks; where the public had had need for such uses, the right was thus
established .... Where there was conflict with the public right of naviga-
tion, the right of navigation prevailed. In short, medieval common law rec-
ognized the only substantial public demand for water use that was exerted.
1 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 182-83 (1967) (footnotes omitted).
30. On the distinction between the jus privatum, or private right of title, and
the jus publicum, or public rights of use, see 4 R. CLARK, supra note 20, at 99-103.
See also Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1894). Both rely heavily on Lord
Chief Justice Hale's treatise DE JURE MARIS, 1 HARGRAVE TRACTS 5-44 (1787) and
S. MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FoRESHORE (3d ed. 1888).
31. There is conflicting authority over whether the Crown could grant away
jus publicum lands. Compare Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842)
("the question must be regarded as settled in England against the right of the
king since Magna Charta to make such a grant.") with 4 R. CLARK, supra note 20,
at 101 ("Statements found in the American cases which assume that the King
could not grant the beds of navigable waters, the jus privatum, in to private own-
ership are wrong.").
32. See, e.g., CARNEGIE INST. OF WASHINGTON, HISTORY OF TRANSPORTATION IN
THE UNITED STATES BEFORE 1860 5 (1917) [hereinafter CARNEGIE]. The first explor-
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to the density of the forests and the difficulty of road construc-
tion, the watercourses provided transportation routes, and their
shores afforded logical areas for settlement.3 4 Fishing was signifi-
ers followed the rivers to find outlets to the West through the Appalachian Moun-
tains. Id. See also W. LASS, A HISTORY OF STEAMBOATING ON THE UPPER MISSOURI
RIVER 5 (1962). The history of pioneer steamboating navigation began in 1819
with the government-sponsored Yellowstone Expedition. Id. See also R. RUSSELL,
IMPROVEMENTS OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE PACIFIC COAST AS AN ISSUE IN AMERI-
CAN POLITICS 1783-1864 3 (1948). In 1803, the Lewis and Clark expedition was sent
to explore the Missouri so that "trade be consequently conducted through the
Missouri and United States more beneficially than by circumnavigation now prac-
ticed." Id.
The fur trade dominated by the American Fur Company was the major busi-
ness on the upper Missouri from the late 1820s to 1862. The need to carry supplies
into the region, and the need for reliable downstream transportation for increasing
quantities of fur, encouraged companies to look into steam navigation of the Up-
per Missouri. W. LASS, STEAMBOATING ON THE UPPER MISSOURI RIVER 8 (1962). The
Mississippi also received heavy use for the shipping of furs. For example, "the
average annual value of the fur trade of upper Louisiana for 15 successive years
ending in 1804 amounted to $203,750." CARNEGIE, supra, at 100.
33. River navigation was also extremely important to the logging industry,
since the construction of roads into remote forested areas was often impractical.
Log floating was a difficult process but was the only way to use rivers that were
not passable by boats.
Still, if the rivers could be made passable, the timber industry could expand.
One example of the efforts to make the rivers navigable occurred in Washington
State on the Puyallup River. In 1889, the Tacoma Land Co. chartered one of the
longest dredging operations in the world to date. The dredger, a 50-horsepower
steam engine, labored to deepen the channel connecting the ocean with an up-
river portion of the Puyallup River where a mill had been built. The dredger shot
the silt out of the channel of the stream to the marshy side banks. The project
cost $300,000 and took two years. It took nature one series of storms in late 1891
to destroy most of the work that had been done. The importance of the early
watercourses to the American people is underscored by the fact that the Tacoma
Land Co. immediately set about remaking the channel, this time using a different
route. The path that the Puyallup River takes today is due to the determination
of these early settlers. M. MORGAN, THE MILL ON THE BOOT, THE STORY OF THE ST.
PAUL AND TACOMA LUMBER Co. 91-98 (1982).
34. 1 S. DUNBAR, A HISTORY OF TRAVEL IN AMERICA 16-17 (1915). Trees in the
eastern American forests during the early colonial days were typically two to five
feet in diameter. Some of the largest were 12 or 15 feet in thickness. The area
under the standing trees was often covered with fallen trees. Horses were useless
except near settlements or on a beaten path. Id; CARNEGIE, supra note 32, at 55. A
traveler from Baltimore to Washington around 1791 described the roads as
'so exceedingly bad that a carriage will sometimes sink so deep as to defy
the utmost exertions of the strongest horse to draw it forwards; and in some
parts that would be otherwise totally impassable, causeways constructed of
trees are thrown across the road; but these frequently break asunder and
[Vol. 19:425
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cant, both for commercial and subsistence purposes.35 The Revo-
lutionary War and the War of 1812 demonstrated the military ne-
cessity of controlling the natural highways."6 The new nation
realized that water had more abstract value as well.3 7 As William
constantly expose a traveler to the most imminent danger .... Such is the
high road to the federal city of Washington.'
Id. See, e.g., CARNEGIE, supra note 32, at 94-116 (discussing the Ohio and Missis-
sippi rivers); 1 S. DUNBAR, supra, at 25 (listing four areas adjoining water as the
early Colonial settlements: Chesapeake Bay, New York Bay and the Great River
of the Mountains, the Connecticut River Valley and Long Island Sound, and Dela-
ware Bays and Susquehanna Rivers).
35. During the mid-1600s, 730 vessels were built by the Massachusetts colony
alone. Many of these boats were devoted chiefly to fishing or to trade with Eng-
land, the West Indies and the other colonies, "but boats of some sort were kept by
families living near water just as a modern farmer or business man keeps an auto-
mobile." 1 S. DUNBAR, supra note 34, at 28-29. The Ohio River was filled with a
variety of fish such as the "agile pike, the fat groveling cat-fish, and the silver
scaled perch." C. AMBLER, A HISTORY OF TRANSPORTATION IN THE OHIO VALLEY 25
(1932).
36. CARNEGIE, supra note 32, at 91-93. The costs of transportation during the
War of 1812 were exceedingly burdensome. It is probable that $60 million was
spent on transportation during the War of 1812, due primarily to the lack of roads
and watercourses. Cannons cost $1 per pound and flour cost $40 to $50 per barrel
because of the transportation costs. It was an almost universal opinion that the
money spent on transportation would have been enough to construct all the facili-
ties that were lacking. For example, the Allegheny River could have been im-
proved and available for government use during the war for one quarter the ex-
pense incurred in transportation between Pittsburgh and Erie. Id. at 91.
37. The beauty of the oceans, rivers and streams gave rise to much of the
literature and art of the time. Mark Twain described the mighty Mississippi in
many of his works, including ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN and LIFE ON THE
Mississippi. Henry David Thoreau philosophized at Walden Pond, and Herman
Melville described the power of the ocean in MOBY DICK.
The opening of the Erie Canal led to the founding of one of the earliest
schools of painters in America. The Hudson River School, consisting of artists
such as Thomas Cole, John Trumbull, William Dunlap and Asher Durand,
painted much of the Hudson Valley. J. HOWAT, THE HUDSON RIVER AND ITS PAINT-
ERS 27-29 (1972). For Thomas Cole, "every landscape is defective" without water.
Wilmering, American Waters: The Flow of Imagination, in THE WATERS OF
AMERICA, 19TH CENTURY AMERICAN PAINTINGS OF RIVERS, STREAMS, LAKES AND WA-
TERFALLS 3 (1984). Lake George, Niagara Falls, the Great Lakes, the Missouri, and
the Mississippi all became the subject of early American painters such as Thomas
Doughty, Alvan Fisher and George Caleb Bingham. Id. George Catlin ventured
2500 miles up the Missouri River in 1832, creating over 140 paintings. Karl
Bodmer traveled over the United States painting scenes from the Ohio, Delaware,
Mississippi, Yellowstone, and Big Sioux Rivers, and the Bay of New York.
Bodmer painted numerous landscape, steamboat, and river traffic scenes. In addi-




When breezes are soft and skies are fair,
I steal an hour from study and care,
And hie me away to the woodland scene,
Where wanders the stream with waters of green,
As if the bright fringe of herbs on its brink
Had given their stain to the waves they drink;
And they, whose meadows it murmurs through,
Have named the stream from its own fair hue.38
Mark Twain described the beauty of the steamboat and the river
in Huckleberry Finn,
One or twice of a night we would see a steamboat slipping along in
the dark, and now and then she would belch a whole world of
sparks up out of her chimbleys, and they would rain down in the
river and look awful pretty; then she would turn a corner and her
lights would wink out and her pow-wow shut off and leave the river
still again, and by-and-by her waves would get us, a long time after
she was gone, and joggle the raft a bit, and after that you wouldn't
hear nothing for you couldn't tell how long, except maybe frogs or
something. 9
The great economic savings made possible by transportation
on the watercourses attracted the attention of entrepreneurs. 0
Even before the waterways were improved, the cost savings from
water transportation were significant. 41 Both the watercourses
countered on his journeys. The paintings of Bodmer and Catlin not only portrayed
the beauty of the early American waterways, and encouraged many settlers to go
West, but also left a historical record of the people and the rustic sights. Hunt &
Gallagher, The Plates in KARL BODMER'S AMERICA (1984).
Even in the naming of the rivers, Americans attempted to describe the beauty
of the watercourses. The Ohio River, for example, was called "La Belle Riviere" or
"the Beautiful River" by the French explorers. The origins of the word "Ohio"
may come from the Indian word "Ohi," a prefix meaning "very," frequently used
by the Indians with other words meaning "the white foaming river." C. AMBLER,
supra note 35, at 21-22.
38. Bryant, Green River, in THE NEW OXFORD BOOK OF AMERICAN VERSE 33
(R. Ellmann ed. 1976).
39. 2 G. MCMICHAEL, ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN LITERATURE, REALISM TO THE
PRESENT 423 (1980) (quoting M. TWAIN, HUCKLEBERRY FINN).
40. See, e.g., R. SHAW, ERIE WATER WEST, A HISTORY OF THE ERIE CANAL
1792-1854 7 (1966) ("In 1814, Robert Fulton wrote that it cost $2.00 to send a
barrel of flour 130 miles overland; the same barrel could go by water from Albany
to New York City for $0.25, a distance of 160 miles.").
41. A striking example of the difference between land and water carriage in-
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themselves and the boats floating on them evolved with the desire
to increase trade."' Many states began to make nonnavigable wa-
terways navigable and started construction of canals to link natu-
ral watercourses. 4 3 One of the earliest canals, the Erie Canal, com-
pleted in 1825, propelled New York City into status as a major
port. Towns in the area that were unconnected with the canal
never regained their former leadership in transportation." The
earliest boats used by the colonists were canoes, followed by flat
bottomed boats." Innovations progressed" and culminated in the
volved two factories established for trade with the Indians, the Georgia and Tel-
lico factories. Money was appropriated for the factories in March of 1795, and the
merchandise for both factories was purchased in Philadelphia. By January 1, 1801,
the Georgia factory showed a gain of $15,740.83, while the Tellico factory showed
a profit of only $309.53. The difference lay in the fact that the Georgia factory
shipped by river to Savannah, and then forwarded the goods by wagon, but the
Tellico factory had to travel entirely by land at high carriage rates. CARNEGIE,
supra note 32, at 80.
42. See generally 1 S. DUNBAR, supra note 34, at 38-56, 392-414; CARNEGIE,
supra note 32, at 94-116.
43. See generally CARNEGIE, supra note 32, at 161-279 (describing canals such
as the Erie Canal in New York, the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal in Pennsylva-
nia, and the James River and Kanawha Canal in Virginia).
44. A. BOLLES, INDUSTRIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 605-08 (3d ed.
1881). The entire Erie Canal region also benefited greatly from the opening of the
canal. Between 1810 and 1835, the population of the area tripled. Many cities in
western New York became some of the most rapidly growing cities in the nation.
Towns such as Rochester, Albany, Syracuse, and Buffalo showed significant
growth. The economy of the region also boomed. Agricultural staples increased by
22%, as did the average size of the farms. Manufacturing increased 262% in the
20 years between 1820 and 1840. Jobs in commerce and navigation grew tenfold.
R. SHAW, supra note 40, at 262-64.
45. 1 S. DUNBAR, supra note 34, at 21-22. The Indians and later early settlers
used two types of canoes, either a canoe built from one log that was shaped and
hollowed out, which was strong but slow moving, or a more graceful and mobile
canoe built of birch bark sewn together with roots. Id.; CARNEGIE, supra note 32,
at 94-97. Flat bottomed boats appeared on the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers as
early as 1782, and depended entirely on the current for propulsion. The flat bot-
tomed boat was used only for transportation downstream and was built with
strong perpendicular sides and a flat bottom. It was then used downstream to
construct buildings for the new settlers who travelled on it. Id. at 95-97.
46. Travel down the Ohio and the Mississippi was improved by the introduc-
tion of the barge. These barges had a capacity of 50 to 100 tons, and made two
round trips a year from New Orleans to Cincinnati. The upstream trips were ac-
complished by the use of a sail or by tying a rope to the barge and carrying the
rope to shore and having the boatman walk and pull the boat. The boats could
also employ a "warping" technique by wrapping a rope around a tree. The men
could then pull the boat up to that point. Some crews also used setting poles.
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steamboat, which revolutionized the transportation of the day by
allowing upstream travel at the rate of five miles per hour.'
Given the importance of the public waterways, the central
role that they would play in public law and policy during the na-
tion's early years was inevitable. In 1783, while traveling into the
interior, George Washington commented,
I could not help taking a more extensive view of the vast in-
land navigation of these United States and could not but be struck
by the immense extent and importance of it, and of the goodness of
that Providence which has dealt its favors to us with so profuse a
hand. Would to God we may have the wisdom to improve them.
4'8
Article IV of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, reenacted in 1789
as the eighth law adopted by the First Congress, provided:
The navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Law-
rence, and the carrying places between the same, shall be common
highways, and forever free, as well to the inhabitants of the said
territory, as to the citizens of the United States, and those of any
other States that may be admitted into the confederacy, without
any tax, impost, or duty therefor."
Congressional regulation of commerce on navigable watercourses
was a primary area of emphasis during the early years of the Re-
public.50 Thomas Jefferson, who envisioned uniting the continent
CARNEGIE, supra note 32, at 98.
47. D. BUCKMAN, OLD STEAMBOAT DAYS ON THE HUDSON RIVER 11-12 (1907).
On August 17, 1807, Robert Fulton sailed from New York to Albany in 32 hours
traveling at an average speed of five miles per hour. The wind was ahead of the
boat on both of the legs of the journey, so that, in Fulton's own words "the whole
has, therefore, been performed by the power of the steam engine." The speed of
five miles an hour meant that Fulton and his partner, Chancellor Livingston, met
the conditions of the New York Legislature giving them the exclusive right and
privilege of navigating steamboats for a 20 year period. Id. This exclusive right of
navigation eventually gave rise to the litigation in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1 (1824), discussed infra text accompanying notes 54-57.
48. B. WATTENBERG, BusY WATERWAYS, THE STORY OF AMERICA'S INLAND
WATER TRANSPORTATION 21 (1964) (quoting George Washington).
49. Ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789). See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
50. See generally W. HULL & R. HULL, THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
WATERWAYS POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 6 (1967) [hereinafter HULL]. As early as
1771, the colony of Pennsylvania declared the Lehigh and Delaware Rivers to be
common highways for the purposes of navigation and fined any person obstructing
the free flow of traffic. 1 L. HUNTER, WATER POWER, A HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL
POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 142 (1979).
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through the watercourses, initiated the Lewis and Clark expedi-
tions in 1803 to "explore the river Missouri, from its mouth to its
source, and, crossing the highlands by the shortest portage, to
seek the best water communication thence to the Pacific ocean..
.,,1 Politically, water improvements were popular and commonly
appeared in the party platforms of the day."
In an even larger sense, water was a unifying factor for the
Nation. Rivers and lakes facilitated trade, allowed immigration to
new areas, and established communication lines among the states.
The need for one central governing body to oversee water traffic
was a key impetus for Congress' primacy under the commerce
clause of the Constitution." Chief Justice Marshall explained the
significance of the clause and of navigation to the nation as a
whole in Gibbons v. Ogden, ' by saying that "It]he power over
commerce, including navigation, was one of the primary objects
for which the people of America adopted their government, and
must have been contemplated in forming it."" Gibbons v. Ogden,
Much of Congress' work related to the nation's waters. For instance, in 1803,
statutes concerning the watercourses accounted for one-quarter of all the congres-
sional laws passed in that year: of 42 statutes, 11 concerned water or the Navy.
Examples of the laws passed were appropriations for the Naval Service, clearance
to certain vessels in the Mississippi, an additional armament for the protection of
the commerce of the United States, passports to ships and vessels of the United
States, and a statute concerning the salt springs on the waters of the Wabash
River. Ch. 1-40, 2 Stat. 199-244 (1803).
51. P. CUTRIGHT, A HISTORY OF THE LEWIS AND CLARK JOURNALS 12 (1976)
(quoting Thomas Jefferson). "The necessity of guaranteeing the continued free
navigation of the Mississippi in order to reassure the restive inhabitants of the
South and West that their rights would be protected, played a major role in
Thomas Jefferson's decision to purchase the Louisiana Territory from France in
1803." HULL, supra note 50, at 7.
52. In 1819, the Erie Canal was "[s1o popular ... that no party could openly
oppose it and still gain office." R. SHAW, supra note 40, at 107. See generally id. at
101-22.
53. "The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Other constitutional provisions indicating the framers' overriding
concern with free navigation include the tonnage duty clause of U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 10, cl. 3; the import-export clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2; the ports and
vessels clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6; and the admiralty clause, U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
54. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
55. Id. at 190. Marshall also explained, in Brown v. Maryland, that "those
who were capable of estimating the influence of commerce on the prosperity of
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one of the first Supreme Court commerce clause decisions, in-
volved a monopoly of the steamboats in New York State; the con-
flict between steamboat monopolies and free watercourses was of
great concern nationally.5 Marshall, upholding a federal license
granted outside of the New York scheme and justifying the need
for federal regulation of the waterways, wrote that "deep streams
... pass through the interior of almost every State in the Union,
and furnish the means of exercising this right [to regulate com-
merce]. If Congress has the power to regulate it, that power must
be exercised whenever the subject exists."5
Thus, the ribbons of waterways tied the early nation to-
gether-economically, politically, and symbolically. As commen-
tators on the waterways of the United States have explained,
A Nation of continental expanse required cheap transportation;
preservation of the Union and the economic welfare and growth of
the Nation demanded an end to sectional rivalries with their at-
tendant burdens on commerce and trade; facility of communication
and ease and economy of transport were prerequisites for holding
and defending the Trans-Appalachian West against the depreda-
tions of foreign powers and the splintering tendencies of the re-
mote frontier. Much the same combination of influences operated
to forge the principle of Federal responsibility for waterway
nations, perceived the necessity of giving the control over this important subject
to a single government." 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 446 (1827).
56. The State of Louisiana had granted exclusive privileges of navigation to
Fulton and Livingston for any steamboats. This effectively required that any
owner of a boat pay royalties to Fulton and Livingston for operating a steamboat
on most reaches of the Mississippi because the end market was in New Orleans.
As a result, very few steamboats ran on the Ohio or Mississippi for a number of
years. In 1816, the State of Ohio passed a resolution to inquire into Louisiana's
right to injure the commerce of sister states by granting the monopoly. The politi-
cal uproar was so strong that Louisiana appointed a commission to investigate
revoking the charter of Livingston and Fulton. However, this charter was not re-
voked. The upstream states
denied the right of Louisiana to prohibit them from using their natural pas-
sageways to the ocean for it amounted to this, since "the legislature might
as well have extended the restriction to a total interdict of the navigation of
the Mississippi within the border of the State or shut the port of New Orle-
ans against us."
CARNEGIE, supra note 32, at 106. A lawsuit was tried in the District Court of Loui-
siana and was on appeal to the Supreme Court when Gibbons v. Ogden was de-
cided. Id.
57. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195.
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improvements."'
The Supreme Court, because of the intrinsic importance of
these resources and the priority that Congress and the new states
placed on them, was asked to rule on a number of major issues
relating to navigable watercourses. During the nineteenth cen-
tury, the Court developed four major doctrines-essentially an in-
tegrated package of state prerogatives, state obligations, and fed-
eral powers-dealing with these watercourses. The doctrines
involve (1) state ownership of the beds and banks of navigable
watercourses, (2) congressional regulatory authority over naviga-
ble watercourses, (3) the navigation servitude, and (4) the public
trust doctrine. They are taken up in the next two sections.
III. NAVIGABLE WATERCOURSES: STATE PREROGATIVES
In England, there was no doubt as to the identity of the
owner of lands under navigable watercourses. England was not a
federal government since all authority emanated from the Crown.
In the United States, however, there were two potential owners,
the United States and the state within which the navigable water-
course was located. The matter of ownership was not so pressing
in the original thirteen states, where lands within state bounda-
ries never passed to the United States; the colonies, now states,
held title to lands within their borders before the union was
formed and they retained ownership to those lands afterward.5 '
The situation was different, however, with respect to the western
lands that the United States obtained through treaties with
France, England, Spain, Mexico, and Russia.s0 As to public lands
not within any state, the United States initially was the owner,
and Congress had legislative authority, apparently under the
property clause of the Constitution, because it was "the only gov-
ernment which [could] impose laws upon" public lands before
statehood."' Nevertheless, the territorial citizens wanted state-
58. HULL, supra note 50, at 8.
59. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
60. These treaties include the Louisiana Purchase (1803), the Convention of
1818 (with Great Britain), the Treaty with Spain (1819), the Treaty of June 15,
1846 (the Oregon Compromise with Great Britain), the Gadsden Purchase (1853),
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo with Mexico (1848), and the Alaska Purchase
(1867). See P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 86 (1968).
61. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48 (1894). See generally Wilkinson, The
1989]
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
hood, and eventually state governments were formed.
The issue of ownership of the beds and banks of navigable
watercourses within the boundaries of new states came before the
Supreme Court in several cases during the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury. 2 The Court probably had a philosophical predisposition at
the time, an era when federal prerogatives were at a low ebb, to
view the states as the appropriate governments."3 Nevertheless, it
would take a considerable stretch to be able to justify ownership
by the western states of lands under navigable watercourses. 4
The difficulty arose because of the nature of the transactions
that led to statehood. Citizens in the West negotiated hard with
federal representatives for favorable provisions in the statehood
acts. One of the key issues was land ownership. Since the federal
government owned the land, territorial representatives had to
make an affirmative request of the United States for a transfer of
federal lands to the new states.
The bargaining over the land transfers from the United
Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 269, 301-02
n.146 (1980). Exceptions to federal ownership of western lands included valid
grants by prior sovereigns-pueblos, Spanish and Mexican Grants, for exam-
ple-and valid grants by the United States prior to statehood.
62. See, e.g., Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876); Weber v. Board of Har-
bor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57 (1873); Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 423 (1867); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845); Martin
v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
63. A passage from Dred Scott v. Sandford is suggestive of that philosophical
leaning:
The principle upon which our Governments rest, and upon which alone
they continue to exist, is the union of States, sovereign and independent
within their own limits in their internal and domestic concerns, and bound
together as one people by a General Government, possessing certain enu-
merated and restricted powers, delegated to it by the people of the several
States, and exercising supreme authority within the scope of the powers
granted to it, throughout the dominion of the United States. A power,
therefore, in the General Government to obtain and hold colonies and de-
pendent territories, over which they might legislate without restriction,
would be inconsistent with its own existence in its present form. Whatever
it acquires, it acquires for the benefit of the people of the several States
who created it. It is their trustee acting for them.
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 447-48 (1856).
64. The principal difficulty here was the silence of federal land grants, to
states, on title to those beds and banks. See infra text accompanying notes 75-97.
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States to the new states never failed to be heated." Ohio was the
first public land state in 1803.6 Congress finally agreed to grant
Ohio, along with other more minor grants, one section (section 16)
out of every township;6 7 a section is one square mile and each
township contains thirty-six sections. In all, Ohio received about
four percent of all land within its borders.6 8 Over time, Congress
became more generous with new states.6 9 Later states received
two sections in each township.70 The latest states in the Lower
Forty-Eight made even more favorable bargains. Utah, Arizona,
and New Mexico each received four sections per township for
school lands, and a total of fourteen to sixteen percent of all land
within the state.71 In all cases, states received additional express
grants in the statehood acts for various designated purposes.7 12 Fi-
nally, the United States agreed to transfer to Alaska 103 million
65. See, e.g., P. GATES, supra note 60, at 317:
From the admission of Ohio in 1803 to that of Alaska in 1959 the terri-
torial- and state-making policy involved Congress and the people of the ter-
ritories in complicated and lengthy political disputes in which there was
[sic] being hammered out agreements concerning the management and
sharing of the public lands as well as the basis for the fundamental law of
each state. In the process the states were brought, with some reluctance, to
give up any plans or ideas some of their leaders may have entertained of
either acquiring or controlling and managing their public lands as the Origi-
nal Thirteen and Texas did.
66. Vermont (previously within the borders of New York) and Kentucky
(carved out of Virginia) were in a different situation because the federal govern-
ment never owned any significant amount of land within their borders. As for
Tennessee, North Carolina ceded the lands now comprising Tennessee to the
United States. However, Congress failed to make any provision in Tennessee's En-
abling Act as to federal ownership of public land. After a lengthy political and
legal dispute, the state succeeded in obtaining title to the public land. Because the
original states granted Ohio's lands to the United States, Ohio became a "proving
ground" for several statehood issues, including state land grants. See P. GATES,
supra note 60, at 285-91.
67. Ohio Enabling Act, ch. 37 § 7, 2 Stat. 173, 175 (1802).
68. P. GATES, supra note 60, at 291.
69. "States which entered the Union late profited from the experience of the
older ones in bargaining with Congress and won double, and in 1896 quadruple,
the earlier donations for schools and an elaboration of donations for higher educa-
tional institutions." P. GATES, supra note 60, at 317.
70. See, e.g., Act of August 14, 1848, ch. 177, § 20, 9 Stat. 323, 330 (1848)
(establishment of Oregon Territory).
71. Utah Enabling Act, ch. 138, § 6, 28 Stat. 107, 109 (1894); Arizona and
New Mexico Enabling Act, ch. 310, §§ 6 & 24, 36 Stat. 557, 561, 572 (1910).




acres of the 365 million acres in the state."
In addition to the statehood grants, states subsequently ob-
tained still more federal land through express statutory grant
programs. As Paul Gates, the leading historian on public land
law, explained,
These compacts [at statehood] were not to satisfy the new states
for long. They soon urged the Federal government to give them
additional lands to help finance the building of specified canals and
wagon roads and the improvement of waterways. Later they
wanted land grants for railroads and for the endowment of agricul-
tural colleges. They demanded also that the swamplands, that is,
all the overflowed, wet, swampy or poorly drained land, be turned
over to the states to be reclaimed by them and made into cultiva-
ble farmlands. Far more land went to the states under the many
general and special laws granting land for various purposes than
was transferred to them under the provisions of the various ena-
bling acts.7
4
The United States never expressly granted to the new states,
either in the statehood acts or in the later land grant statutes, the
lands under navigable watercourses. Given the tremendous
amount of attention that was trained on land grants at statehood
and in subsequent years, it would have been easy for the courts to
find that there was no intent to transfer such important property
interests out of federal ownership.75 The standard maxim of con-
73. Alaska Enabling act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 6(a)-(b), 72 Stat. 339, 340
(1958).
74. P. GATEs, supra note 60, at 319.
75. Two passages in Shively v. Bowlby discuss the general rule of strict con-
struction applied in construing grants made by the sovereign. The first states:
The rule of construction in the case of such a grant from the sovereign is
quite different from that which governs private grants. The familiar rule
and its chief foundation were felicitously expressed by Sir William Scott:
"All grants of the Crown are to be strictly construed against the grantee,
contrary to the usual policy of the law in the consideration of grants; and
upon this just ground, that the prerogatives and rights and emoluments of
the Crown being conferred upon it for great purposes, and for the public
use, it shall not be intended that such prerogatives, rights and emoluments
are diminished by any grant, beyond what such grant by necessary and un-
avoidable construction shall take away.". . . Many judgments of this court
are to the same effect.
152 U.S. 1, 10 (1894).
In the second relevant passage, the Court states that under the common law,
It is equally well settled that a grant from the sovereign of land
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struction, inclusio unius est exclusio alterius (the inclusion of
one is the exclusion of another), seems tailor-made for this situa-
tion.7 With so much express statutory action on the subject, how
could there be room for an implied grant? Real property transac-
tions are done by treaty, statute, deed, or patent. To leave a land
transfer of such magnitude and complexity to implication is aber-
rational in the extreme.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court concluded that lands under
navigable watercourses did pass by implication to new states at
the time of statehood. The leading cases were Martin v. Wad-
dell" in 1842 and Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan in 1845.7 ' The Court
reached its holding as a matter of constitutional law.79 The state-
bounded by the sea, or by any navigable tide water, does not pass any title
below high water mark, unless either the language of the grant, or long us-
age under it, clearly indicates that such was the intention.
Id. at 13. See also Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 411 (1842) ("it will
not be presumed that [the king] intended to part from any portion of the public
domain, unless clear and especial words are used to denote it.").
76. An example of the Supreme Court's use of the principle of inclusio unius
est exclusio alterius in the context of statehood is found in Ervien v. United
States. In construing the Enabling Act of the State of New Mexico, the Court
stated: "[tihere is in the Enabling Act a specific enumeration of the purposes for
which the lands were granted and the enumeration is necessarily exclusive of any
other purpose." 251 U.S. 41, 47 (1919). This application of exclusio unius est ex-
clusio alterius to the purposes of a grant suggests, a fortiori, that the principle
governs construction of the corpus of the grant.
77. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842). Although Martin v. Waddell involved a
dispute over lands in one of the original 13 states, New Jersey, the case is founda-
tional in the Court's analysis of the equal footing doctrine. See supra note 9.
78. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845). Pollard's Lessee involved a title dispute in
the new state of Alabama, which was created from lands ceded to the United
States by Georgia and Virginia. Id. at 220-22. At issue was title to lands lying
below the high watermark of the navigable, freshwater Mobile River. Plaintiffs
claimed ownership under a federal patent issued after Alabama's admission to the
Union; defendants claimed under a state grant. The Court held that lands below
the high watermark of navigable watercourses passed to the states under the equal
footing doctrine. The federal patent was therefore inoperative, as Congress had no
power to transfer to individuals the title to state-owned lands. Id. at 229.
79. The Pollard's Lessee Court engaged in a lengthy discussion of the author-
ity for its holding in the following passage:
The compact made between the United States and the state of Georgia, was
sanctioned by the Constitution of the United States; by the 3d section of
the 4th article of which it is declared, that "New states may be admitted by
the Congress into this union; but no new state shall be formed or erected
within the jurisdiction of any other state, nor any state be formed by the
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hood clause, article 4, section 3, clause 1, provides that "New
States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union ... "
The Court, looking to the constitutional phrase "this Union,"80
has developed the equal footing doctrine, requiring that new
states enter the Union on a basis of full political equality with all
other states." The mid-century Court reasoned that the western
junction of two or more states or parts of states, without the consent of the
legislatures of the states concerned, as well as of Congress."
When Alabama was admitted into the union, on an equal footing with
the original states, she succeeded to all the rights of sovereignty, jurisdic-
tion, and eminent domain which Georgia possessed at the date of the ces-
sion .... Nothing remained to the United States, according to the terms of
the agreement, but the public lands.
44 U.S. (3 How.) at 223.
The Court further stated, "[tihe right of Alabama and every other new state
to exercise all the powers of government, which belong to and may be exercised by
the original states of the union, must be admitted, and remain unquestioned ...."
Id. at 224. The Court found that any reservation or exercise of municipal sover-
eignty within a state by the United States would be "repugnant to the Constitu-
tion ...." Id. Ultimately, the Court held that the rights of states include title to
the beds and banks of navigable watercourses: "First, The shores of navigable wa-
ters, and the soils under them, were not granted by the Constitution to the United
States, but were reserved to the states respectively. Secondly, The new states have
the same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction over this subject as the original
states." Id. at 230.
80. Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911). The Supreme Court refuted
suggestions that the political power of states might be diminished by acts of Con-
gress accepted as conditions to statehood, stating,
"This Union" was and is a union of States, equal in power, dignity and
authority, each competent to exert that residuum of sovereignty not dele-
gated to the United States by the Constitution itself. To maintain other-
wise would be to say that the Union, through the power of Congress to
admit new States, might come to be a union of States unequal in power, as
including States whose powers were restricted only by the Constitution,
with others whose powers had been further restricted by an act of Congress
accepted as a condition of admission. Thus it would result, first, that the
powers of Congress would not be defined by the Constitution alone, but in
respect to new States, enlarged or restricted by the conditions imposed
upon new States by its own legislation admitting them into the Union; and,
second, that such new States might not exercise all of the powers which had
not been delegated by the Constitution, but only such as had not been fur-
ther bargained away as conditions of admission.
Id.
81. Different cases have phrased the scope of the political equality enjoyed by
the states differently. Compare supra notes 9 and 80. A third formulation is found
in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, which states "[tihere can be no distinction
between the several States of the Union in the character of the jurisdiction, sover-
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states were entitled to own title to lands under navigable water-
courses as a matter of equal footing: since the original states re-
tained those lands, the Court reasoned, so too must the western
states in order to achieve equality."'
The Court's analysis can be criticized on a number of counts.
First, the equal footing doctrine is, in all of its other aspects, a
rule of political equality, not equality of actual power or real
property."s Some states are larger than others, some have vast
stores of natural resources, some are suitable for large popula-
tions. The equal footing doctrine has never been used to adjust
such differences and it remains anomalous as to why the doctrine
has in this one instance moved beyond political equality into the
uncertain realm of equality of property rights. Second, while the
original states retained lands within their borders, it was clear
from all of the statehood transactions with western states that
Congress did not intend a complete transfer of federal public
eignty and dominion which they may possess and exercise over persons and sub-
jects within their respective limits." 146 U.S. 387, 434 (1892).
82. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan has been consistently followed. See, e.g.,
United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926) ("The State of Minne-
sota was admitted into the Union in 1858 .... and under the constitutional princi-
ple of equality among the several States the title to the bed of Mud Lake then
passed to the State, if the lake was navigable, and if the bed had not already been
disposed of by the United States."); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894)
("The new States admitted into the Union since the adoption of the Constitution
have the same rights as the original States in the tide waters, and in the lands
below the high water mark, within their respective jurisdictions."); Weber v.
Board of Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57, 65-66 (1873) ("Upon the admis-
sion of California into the Union upon equal footing with the original States, abso-
lute property in, and dominion and sovereignty over, all soils under the tidewaters
within her limits passed to the State . ); Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. (6
Wall,) 423, 436 (1867).
83. The leading article on the equal footing doctrine thus concluded that
"whatever may be or have been the accurate meaning of 'equal footing,' neither
side at the time thought that it implied any transfer of property." Hanna, Equal
Footing in the Admission of States, 3 BAYLOR L. REV. 519 (1951). On the scope of
political powers held by states under the equal footing doctrine, see, e.g., Coyle v.
Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 573 (1911) ("when a new State is admitted into the
Union, it is so admitted with all of the powers of sovereignty and jurisdiction
which pertain to the original States, and.., such powers may not be constitution-
ally diminished, impaired or shorn away by any conditions, compacts or stipula-
tions embraced in the act under which the new State came into the Union, which




land.14 The equal footing doctrine has never been found to re-
quire an implied general transfer of all federal land to new
states.85 Thus the original states and the new states are unequal
as far as the proportion of state land ownership within their bor-
ders is concerned. There has been no explanation as to how the
equal footing doctrine could somehow make a distinction between
expressly granted lands, lands under navigable watercourses, and
all other lands retained by the United States.8 6 Third, the implied
transfer of lands under navigable watercourses has required an
exceedingly complicated transfer process. It is one thing to pro-
vide for the transfer to new states of two or four sections in every
township; the United States' rectangular survey system gives us
an easy way to grant those patents. Lands under navigable water-
courses, however, follow no survey lines and come in strips, half-
moons, and blotches.8s Further, determining navigability for title,
which defines the extent of the grants, raises exceedingly complex
fact questions."8 Thus one result of the mid-nineteenth century
cases, as a matter of judicial administration, is that the Court
bought into one and a half centuries of maddening litigation with
many more years to come. Finally, as already discussed, the Court
never addressed the issue of how such a far-flung grant by impli-
cation could be justified amidst an extensive program of express
84. See supra text accompanying notes 61-75.
85. See, e.g., Nevada ex rel. Nev. State Bd. of Agric. v. United States, 512 F.
Supp. 166 (D. Nev. 1981), aff'd, 699 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1983).
86. To be sure, the Court has traditionally explained the transfer of title to
the states as being "incident to the transfer to the State of local sovereignty .... "
United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935). See also the cases assembled in 1
R. CLARK, supra note 29, at 195 n.76. This explanation begs the question: no rea-
son was given for distinguishing beds and banks of navigable watercourses from
fast lands as an "incident of sovereignty."
Furthermore, the argument that title to the beds of navigable watercourses is
itself a source of state authority-sovereignty-is belied by the common relin-
quishment of such title to riparian proprietors under the laws of many states. See,
e.g., the survey of state law as to title in Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 18-26
(1894). Given the expansive powers of Congress to regulate interstate commerce,
see supra note 13, no ultimate regulatory authority is conferred on the states by
virtue of the implied grants under Martin and Pollard's Lessee. Thus, the "inci-
dent of sovereignty" argument is unpersuasive.
87. The matter is additionally complicated because watercourses can and do
move. For a discussion of what happens to the underlying title to the riverbed
when a river meanders, shifts, or cuts a new channel during a flood, see Oregon ex
rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977).
88. See supra note 8.
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statutory land grants. 9
The Court found for the states on another major issue, the
geographical reach of the navigability-for-title doctrine. Rather
than limiting the reach of the doctrine to those waters affected by
the ebb and flow of the tide, as was the case under English com-
mon law, the Court found in The Genesee Chief" and Barney v.
Keokuk" that "the broad differences existing between the extent
and topography of the British island and that of the American
continent" required a different rule.9 2 The United States pos-
sessed "great rivers and inland seas"9 that in fact are navigable
and should come within the scope of the implied statehood
grant." Over time, the Court developed a complicated federal
test, often looking to evidence of log floats and commercial fur
trade, to determine whether a river is navigable in fact. 5 Thus,
89. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
90. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851).
91. 94 U.S. 324 (1876).
92. Id. at 338.
93. Id.
94. See also Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661 (1891). In Packer, the Court quoted
with approval an earlier statement of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that
had rejected the British rule:
In Pennsylvania the common law doctrine was never recognized .... [Tihe
Supreme Court of that State, in holding that the river Monongahela was a
navigable stream, and that its soil up to low-water mark, and the river it-
self, were the property of the Commonwealth, said:
"We are aware that by the common law of England such streams
as the Mississippi, the Missouri, the rivers Amazon and Platte,
the Rhine, the Danube, the Po, the Nile, the Euphrates, the Gan-
ges and the Indus, were not navigable rivers, but were the subject
of private property, whilst an insignificant creek in a small island
was elevated to the dignity of a public river, because it was so
near the ocean that the tide ebbed and flowed up the whole of its
petty course. The Roman law, which has pervaded Continental
Europe, and which took its rise in a country where there was a
tideless sea, recognized all rivers as navigable which were really
so, and this common sense view was adopted by the early foun-
ders of Pennsylvania, whose province was intersected by large
and valuable streams, some of which are a mile in breadth."
Id. at 668-69.
95. The classic definition of "navigable waters" was provided in The Daniel
Ball:
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are
navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are
susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for com-
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navigability for purposes of title under American law reaches
much further inland than under British law. In Oregon, for exam-
ple, the McKenzie River is navigable up to mile point thirty-
seven, more than 200 miles above tidewater."
I emphasize that I have no objection, as a matter of policy, to
the broad ownership rights of states as to the lands under naviga-
ble watercourses. Indeed, it strikes me as a perfectly proper sub-
ject for negotiation at the time of statehood. But the transaction
did not come about in that manner. We need to appreciate how
extraordinary it was for the Court to be so activist, to make so
many leaps of doctrine, and finally to embed this far-flung im-
plied land transfer to the states as a constitutional mandate. Nev-
ertheless, today, there is no longer a question as to this issue. The
states have a constitutional right to receive the lands under navi-
gable waterways. As the Court stated in Oregon ex rel. State
Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co. in 1977, "the State's
title to lands underlying navigable waters within its boundaries is
conferred not by Congress but by the Constitution itself."9
merce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the custom-
ary modes of trade and travel on water.
77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). An early and enlightened explanation of the
navigability-in-fact test was made in The Montello, where the Court stated:
The capability of use by the public for purposes of transportation and com-
merce affords the true criterion of the navigability of a river, rather than
the extent and manner of that use. If it be capable in its natural state of
being used for purposes of commerce, no matter in what mode the com-
merce may be conducted, it is navigable in fact, and becomes in law a pub-
lic river or highway. Vessels of any kind that can float upon the water,
whether propelled by animal power, by the wind, or by the agency of steam,
are, or may become, the mode by which a vast commerce can be conducted,
and it would be a mischievous rule that would exclude either in determin-
ing the navigability of a river.
87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 441-42 (1874).
96. Oregon ex rel. Div. of State Lands v. Riverfront Protection Ass'n, 672
F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1982).
97. 429 U.S. 363, 374 (1977). See also Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State
Lands Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198, 205 (1984) ("The Federal Government, of course,
cannot dispose of a right possessed by the State under the equal-footing doctrine
of the United States Constitution."); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S.
49, 55 (1926) ("The State of Minnesota was admitted into the Union in 1858 ....
and under the constitutional principle of equality among the several States the
title to the bed of Mud Lake then passed to the State, if the lake was navigable ..
. ."); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1894) ("To maintain any other doctrine
is to deny that Alabama has been admitted into the Union on an equal footing
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IV. NAVIGABLE WATERCOURSES: STATE OBLIGATIONS AND
FEDERAL PREROGATIVES
Given the national importance of watercourses navigable for
title and the circumstances under which they were transferred to
the states, it is understandable that the judiciary might structure
some limits on the states in their administration of lands under
navigable watercourses. Three such limitations have emerged.
First, under the commerce clause, Congress has authority to regu-
late these watercourses. Of course, today the Court has found fed-
eral regulatory power over commerce to be nearly unlimited," but
the issue of federal supremacy over commerce was hotly disputed
during the Marshall years and the issue was decided in the con-
text of navigable watercourses." Second, the navigation servitude
applies to navigable watercourses. This allows the United States
to condemn land, including state land, up to the high water mark
without being required to pay just compensation.'"0 This limit on
the states' land title is also based on the Constitution: "The Coin-
with the original States, the Constitution, laws and compact to the contrary not-
withstanding." (quoting Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 229
(1845))).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121
(1985); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzen-
bach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
99. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S.
53 (1913) (denying compensation for the lost power-generating value of a hydro-
electric site taken under condemnation by Congress). The Court stated that the
title of private owners to the beds of navigable river
is subordinate to the public right of navigation, and however helpful in pro-
tecting the owner against the acts of third parties, is of no avail against the
exercise of the great and absolute power of Congress over the improvement
of navigable rivers .... If, in the judgment of Congress, the use of the bot-
tom of the river is proper for the purpose of placing therein structures in
aid of navigation, it is not thereby taking private property for a public use,
for the owner's title was in its very nature subject to that use in the interest
of public navigation.
Id. at 62. See also United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 227 (1956)
stating:
It is no answer to say that these private owners had interests in the
water that were recognized by state law. We deal here with the federal do-
main, an area which Congress can completely pre-empt, leaving no vested
private claims that constitute "private property" within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment.
See also United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967).
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merce Clause confers a unique position upon the Government in
connection with navigable waters .... 'For this purpose they are
the public property of the nation, and subject to all the requisite
legislation by Congress.'... This power to regulate navigation
confers upon the United States a 'dominant servitude .... "1
The third limitation on state ownership is another servi-
tude' 0 12-the public trust doctrine. Trust language first appeared
in Martin v. Waddell"'0 in 1842, but the leading case on the tradi-
tional public trust doctrine is Illinois Central Railroad v. Illi-
nois,104 Justice Stephen J. Field's opinion that belongs on any
short list of great natural resource opinions.10 5
Stephen J. Field came to California during the gold rush and
101. United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. at 122-23.
102. For recent references to the public trust as both a "servitude" and an
"easement," see Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n, 466 U.S.
198, 200-05 (1984).
103. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842); see also Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 381
(1891); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71, 74 (1855); Pollard's Lessee v.
Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 220-23 (1845). By 1892, Justice Field was able to
state "the decisions are numerous which declare that such property [title to sub-
merged lands] is held by the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for the
public." Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892).
One of these was Arnold v. Mundy, the earliest state court decision to ac-
knowledge the public trust in the United States. 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821). In Arnold, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey ruled that the state held the beds of navigable wa-
ters as had the King-in trust for the common use of the people. A grant purport-
ing to divest the citizens of common rights was therefore void. 6 N.J.L. at 78.
Arnold was subsequently cited as authority in several cases, including Martin v.
Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 389-91, and Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. at
456.
Smith v. Maryland includes a compilation of other state court decisions rec-
ognizing public rights in navigable waters. 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 74-75. In Smith,
the Supreme Court declared:
But this soil ['below low-water mark'] is held by the State, not only
subject to, but in some sense in trust for, the enjoyment of certain public
rights, among which is the common liberty of taking fish, as well shellfish as
floating fish .... [The State] may forbid all such acts as would render the
public right less valuable, or destroy it altogether. This power results from
the ownership of the soil, from the legislative jurisdiction of the State over
it, and from its duty to preserve unimpaired those public uses for which the
soil is held.
Id. (citations omitted).
104. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
105. Illinois Central has been called the "Lodestar in American Public Trust
Law." Sax, Judicial Intervention, supra note 3, at 489.
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wrote the famous Field Code in California's civil procedure.'0 6 He
was elected to the California Supreme Court in 1857, two years
after Irwin v. Phillips,07 the first case to announce the prior ap-
propriation doctrine as a fruit of local custom, but Field later
wrote a number of "local custom" opinions. 08 In 1863, Field be-
came the first westerner appointed to the United States Supreme
Court and served until 1897, a tenure on the Supreme Court
bench exceeded only by Justice William 0. Douglas.
Field's biographer, Professor Charles W. McCurdy, properly
describes Field as "a massive figure in the history of the United
States Supreme Court."'' 0 Writing in 1909, Edward S. Corwin as-
sessed Field as "the pioneer and prophet of our modern constitu-
tional law."" 0 As a westerner, Field was keenly attuned to natural
resources issues. As one writer explained, he was one of the
first-in a time when such concepts did not come easily-to rec-
ognize that 'the nation's natural resources are "a pie to be di-
vided" rather than "a ladder stretching out beyond the hori-
zon.""' Of course, Illinois Central and the traditional public
106. McCurdy, Stephen J. Field and Public Land Law Development in Cali-
fornia, 1850-1866: A Case Study of Judicial Resource Allocation in Nineteenth-
Century America, 10 L. & Soc'y REV. 235, 239 (1975) [hereinafter McCurdy, Field
Case Study]. For a suggestion that the Field Code was a modified version of a
code advanced by Stephen's older brother, David Dudley Field, a prominent New
York attorney, see W. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 156 (1987). For Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist's treatment of Stephen Field's years on the Supreme Court, and
his career in general, see id. at 153-86.
107. 5 Cal. 140 (1855).
108. On Justice Field's California decisions, see McCurdy, Field Case Study,
supra note 106.
109. McCurdy, Stephen J. Field and the American Judicial Tradition, in
THE FIELDS AND THE LAW 5 (1986) [hereinafter McCurdy, Stephen J. Field]. Ear-
lier, Professor McCurdy called Field "[t]he most important figure among an entire
generation of energetic California jurists .... McCurdy, Field Case Study, supra
note 106, at 239-40. During his term as Chief Justice of the California Supreme
Court (1859-1863), Field "earned a national reputation as 'the end of the law' on
far-western resource matters." McCurdy, Stephen J. Field, supra, at 5.
110. McCurdy, Stephen J. Field, supra note 109, at 5.
111. McCurdy, Field Case Study, supra note 106, at 265. The strength of
Justice Field's views on the government's trust responsibilities is evidenced by the
opinion's departure from Field's usually strong support of private property and
contract rights. See Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Protec-
tion of Economic Interests, 1889-1910, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 324, 331-35 (1985) (com-
menting on the authorship of Illinois Central "by no less a friend of private prop-
erty than Justice Field ....").
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trust doctrine are bulwarks upon which such conclusions rest.
In 1869, the state of Illinois had granted to the Illinois Cen-
tral Railroad more than 1000 acres comprising a substantial part
of Chicago's waterfront on Lake Michigan, a navigable lake. The
grant included submerged lands in Chicago's harbor; the area
is as large as that embraced by all the merchandise docks along the
Thames at London; is much larger than that included in the fa-
mous docks and basins at Liverpool; is twice that of the port of
Marseilles, and nearly if not quite equal to the pier area along the
water front of the city of New York." 2
Four years later, amid cries of corruption, the state of Illinois re-
voked its earlier absolute' grant.
The Supreme Court recognized that Illinois received title to
the harbor by implication at statehood.'" The state's title, how-
ever, was impressed with a public trust in order to keep these
waterways open to the public for uses such as navigation, com-
merce, and fishing.' Accordingly, "[a]ny grant of the kind is nec-
essarily revocable, and the exercise of the trust by which the
property was held by the State can be resumed at any time."" 6
The opinion left no doubt that the traditional public trust doc-
trine imposes obligations on the states:
A grant of all the lands under the navigable waters of a State has
never been adjudged to be within the legislative power; and any
attempted grant of the kind would be held, if not absolutely void
on its face, as subject to revocation. The State can no more abdi-
112. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 454 (1892).
113. Although the state maintained that certain limitations had been placed
on the railroad company's control of the harbor beds, 146 U.S. at 451, the railroad
company treated the conveyance as an
absolute conveyance to it of title to the submerged lands, giving it as full
and complete power to use and dispose of the same, except in the technical
transfer of the fee, in any manner it may choose, as if they were uplands, in
no respect covered or affected by navigable waters ....
Id. at 450.
114. Id. at 434-35.
115. See id. at 452:
[Ilt is a title different in character from that which the State holds in lands
intended for sale .... It is a title held in trust for the people of the State
that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over
them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or in-
terference of private parties.
116. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 455.
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cate its trust over property in which the whole people are inter-
ested, like navigable waters and soils under them, so as to leave
them entirely under the use and control of private parties, except
in the instance of parcels mentioned for the improvement of the
navigation and use of the waters, or when parcels can be disposed
of without impairment of the public interest in what remains, than
it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of govern-
ment and the preservation of the peace." 7
Thus was the traditional public trust doctrine, the third limita-
tion on states' ownership of the beds and banks of navigable wa-
tercourses, explained in a comprehensive way.
V. THE SOURCE AND SCOPE OF THE TRADITIONAL TRUST
Today, nearly a century later, after all of the words on the
subject, two foundational issues concerning the traditional doc-
trine have still not been decided. The first matter is the source of
the trust-where does it come from? The second is the scope and
definition of the trust-what law defines the trust and what is the
content of the trust?
The doctrine, as first announced by Justice Field, might be
viewed as stemming either from federal law or from the internal
law of Illinois. Illinois Central, however, seems plainly to have
been premised on federal law. The briefs relied upon both federal
cases and authority from many different states, of which Illinois
was just one." 8 The parties were plainly arguing principles of
117. Id. at 453.
118. See 36 L.Ed. 1018, at 1027-31 for briefs of appellant Illinois Central
Railroad Co.; id. at 1031-34 for briefs of the City of Chicago; id. at 1034-35 for
briefs of the State of Illinois. The wide variety of law argued in brief by the attor-
neys indicates the inconsequential role played by the law of Illinois in the analysis
of the case.
Mr. Benjamin F. Ayer, for appellant, the Illinois Central Railroad Co., cited
federal law repeatedly, and state court decisions from Illinois, Iowa, Massachu-
setts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Vermont, and Wiscon-
sin, as well as the English and Irish Appellate Cases Reporter. See id. at 1027-30.
Mr. J. N. Jewett, also for appellant, likewise drew from a wide array of au-
thority including federal cases and state court decisions from California, Illinois,
Iowa, Kentucky, Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Wisconsin. See
id. at 1030-31.
Mr. John S. Miller, for the City of Chicago, cited both federal cases and state
court decisions from California, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, and Wisconsin. See id. at 1031-33.
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general applicability, not just Illinois law. The Illinois Central
opinion itself leaves little doubt that the Court conceived of a
general trust that applied to all states. Throughout the opinion,
the Court refers to "a state" and employs other phrases of general
applicability.11 9 In describing the trust, the Court made it clear
that the trust derives from federal law and is binding on all
states:
It is the settled law of this country that the ownership of and
dominion and sovereignty over lands covered by tide waters, within
the limits of the several States, belong to the respective States
within which they are found, with the consequent right to use or
dispose of any portion thereof, when that can be done without sub-
stantial impairment of the interest of the public in the waters, and
subject always to the paramount right of Congress to control their
navigation so far as may be necessary for the regulation of corn-
Mr. S. S. Gregory, also for the City of Chicago, cited federal cases and state
court decisions from Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
New Jersey, and New York. See id. at 1033-34.
Mr. George Hunt, Attorney General of the State of Illinois, cited both federal
law and state court decisions from California, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Michigan,
New Jersey, and New York, as well as the King's Bench. See id. at 1034-35.
Further, Justice Stephen Field's opinion cites no Illinois statutes or case law
in discussing the issue of the state's ownership of submerged lands, its trust obli-
gations thereto, or its consequent authority to revoke the grant. The Court does
not cite Illinois law until it turns to a sub-issue involving the City of Chicago's
claim to certain fast lands. See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at. 462.
119. As previously noted, the opinion states: "A grant of all the lands under
the navigable waters of a State has never been adjudged to be within the legisla-
tive power, and any attempted grant of the kind would be held, if not absolutely
void on its face, as subject to revocation." 146 U.S. at 453. Further examples in-
clude: "Any grant of the kind is necessarily revocable .... Id. at 455. See also id.
at 456. In another passage strongly suggesting that Illinois Central is not a ruling
of Illinois law, the Court stated:
We hold, therefore, that the same doctrine as to the dominion and sover-
eignty over and ownership of lands under the navigable waters of the Great
Lakes applies, which obtains at the common law as to the dominion and
sovereignty over and ownership of lands under tide waters on the borders of
the sea, and that the lands are held by the same right in the one case as in
the other, and subject to the same trusts and limitations.
Id. at 436-37. By its own terms, then, one holding of Illinois Central, that lands
underlying the navigable waters of the Great Lakes "are held . . . subject to the
same trusts and limitations" as tide lands bordering the sea, id. at 437, must apply
at least to all states with lands underlying the Great Lakes-Illinois, Indiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.
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merce with foreign nations and among the States. 2
Later Supreme Court decisions have recognized that states are
accorded broad discretion in administering the trust."'1 Neverthe-
less, the subsequent opinions do not disturb Illinois Central's
premise that the public trust doctrine applies on all navigable wa-
tercourses as a matter of federal law.
1 22
The Court has never explicitly stated the specific source of
"the settled law of this country" that mandates the trust in the
"several States." 2 s There are at least four possibilities. First, the
public trust doctrine could be viewed as a matter of federal com-
mon law. This source of law, however, is not in favor and is un-
likely to be employed in light of the more specific available
sources discussed below."2 Second, the Illinois Central Court em-
120. Id. at 435. See also supra note 119; infra note 122.
121. See infra notes 156-63 and accompanying text.
122. The "substantial impairment" language of Illinois Central, see supra
text accompanying note 120, has been repeated with approval by the Supreme
Court. See, e.g., Morris v. United States, 174 U.S. 196, 236 (1899); Shively v.
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 46-47 (1894). More recently, the Court affirmed the federal
nature of the ruling in Illinois Central. See Utah Div. of State Lands v. United
States, 482 U.S. 193, 203 (1987), where Illinois Central is cited as an example of
the "general land laws."
123. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892). Justice Field
noted that "[t]his doctrine has been often announced by this court, and is not
questioned by counsel of any of the parties." Id., (citing Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan,
44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845); Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. (18
Wall.) 57 (1873)).
Indeed, the dissent concurred here as well, stating "[t]he able and interesting
statement, in the opinion of the majority, of the rights of the public in the naviga-
ble waters, and of the limitation of the powers of the State to part with its control
over them, is not dissented from." 146 U.S. at 474 (Shiras, J., dissenting). Thus,
the "no substantial impairment" rule of Illinois Central, like other aspects of the
trust doctrine set forth in Justice Field's opinion, is stronger than the four-to-
three ruling might otherwise suggest. The dissenters argued principally that the
grant was reasonable under the circumstances, id. at 467, and that the Illinois
State Legislature's revocation of the grant was an impairment of contracts in vio-
lation of the United States Constitution. Id. at 473-75 (Shiras, J., dissenting).
124. Federal common law has been disfavored since Justice Brandeis' ruling
in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Nevertheless, some commentators
seem to view the public trust doctrine as being a part of British and early Ameri-
can common law, elevated to the federal common law by Supreme Court endorse-
ment. See, e.g., Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Be-
comes the People's Environmental Right, 14 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 195, 199-200, 210
(1980) ("the concept of the public trust in navigable waters was adopted early in
the country and accepted without hesitation by the United States Supreme
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ployed language similar to that commonly used in the guaranty
clause cases.12 The guaranty clause also has fallen into disuse
and, again, it is unlikely that a modern court would look to it as a
basis for the public trust doctrine." 6
The other two alternatives-the public trust as the product
of congressional preemption resulting from a comprehensive legis-
lative program to keep the major watercourses open and free, or
as constitutionally founded in the commerce clause-are both
much more consonant with the extensive body of law that has
developed around those watercourses that are navigable for title.
A persuasive case can be made that the trust is based on con-
gressional preemption, manifested by implication either through a
comprehensive legislative scheme or, more specifically, through
the statehood acts. Congress' tradition of mandating that naviga-
ble watercourses be kept open to the public runs deep, from the
Northwest Ordinance's guarantee in 1787 that such rivers and
lakes must be "forever free" through the comprehensive matrix of
legislation that Congress has since enacted on the subject of navi-
gation. 2 7 Importantly, the "forever free" language from the
Court."); Note, National Audubon Society v. Superior Court: The Expanding
Public Trust Doctrine, 14 ENVTL. L. 617, 623 (1984) ("In the early 1800s, the
United States Supreme Court incorporated the common law public trust doctrine
into American law." (footnote omitted)). For an extensive reconsideration of the
appropriate bounds for federal common law, see Field, Sources of Law: The Scope
of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 883 (1986).
125. The guaranty clause provides "The United States shall guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government ...." U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 4, cl. 1. Justice Field's assertion that "Itihe State can no more abdicate
its trust.., than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of govern-
ment and the preservation of the peace," Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387, 453 (1892), suggests the concept of a minimum level of state authority below
which a republican government would not exist. The Supreme Court's initial con-
siderations of the guaranty clause are found in, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 1, 37-46 (1849); Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233, 239 (1905).
126. See, e.g., Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912)
(holding that whether a state government is "republican" is a question which fed-
eral courts are not competent to answer). The import of Pacific States, in Profes-
sor Tribe's words, is that "the guaranty clause is not a source of judicially enforce-
able private rights." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 99 (2d ed. 1988).
127. See, e.g., supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text. See generally
Leighty, The Source and Scope of Public and Private Rights in Navigable Wa-
ters, 5 LAND & WATER L. REV. 391 (1970).
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Northwest Ordinance, 28 one of this country's most luminous en-
actments, ' was expressly included in the statehood acts of all
the states in the old Northwest Territory"s and in the charters of
several other states as well.Is The Supreme Court has recognized
Congress' determination to keep the major waterways open in nu-
merous opinions. As Justice Swayne explained in Gilman v. Phil-
adelphia,'s2 "Commerce includes navigation.... This necessarily
includes the power to keep [major watercourses] open and free
from any obstruction to their navigation .
128. See supra text accompanying note 49.
129. Joseph Story called "the famous ordinance" of 1787 "the model of all
our territorial governments ... equally remarkable for the brevity and exactness
of its text, and for its masterly display of the fundamental principles of civil and
religious liberty." 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 187 (1833). Story also called the ordinance a "notable and imperishable
monument." Id. at 190 n.1. Paul Gates remarked on the stature of the Northwest
Ordinance, stating:
The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 was simply an act of the Congress of
the Confederation, and therefore subject to whatever revision any later
Congress might wish to make. Nevertheless, it became something more be-
cause of liberal features written into it and the great prestige it early ac-
quired as part of American democratic traditions.
P. GATES, supra note 60, at 285. The Northwest Ordinance became part of Ameri-
can democratic traditions early; it was re-enacted by the First Congress on August
7, 1789, the eighth statute passed under the new Constitution. 1 Stat. 50 (1789).
130. See -lULL, supra note 50, at 3-7.
131. One authority notes,
After Congress had adopted the Ordinance of 1787 as a statute of the
United States, it then extended to the inhabitants of the Southwest Terri-
tory by the Ordinance of May 26, 1790, the "privileges, benefits and advan-
tages" of the Northwest Ordinance. As a result of this extension, Article IV
of the Compact of the Ordinance of 1787 pertained directly to the rights of
Kentucky, Tennessee and Alabama as well as to the rights of Ohio, Michi-
gan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota (east of the Mississippi River)
and Pennsylvania (that part included in the Erie Purchase).
Id. at 6.
The "forever free" provision of Article IV of the Northwest Ordinance was
also included in the state constitutions of Alabama, Alaska, California, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. For citations, see id. at 56 n.27.
The "forever free" language was also reaffirmed in the enabling acts or admission
acts of Alabama, California, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, Ohio, Oregon, and Wisconsin. For citations to the specific acts, see
id. at 56 n.28.
132. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865).
133. Id. at 724-25. See also, e.g., United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.)
72 (1838); Hobart v. Drogan, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 108 (1836); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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Since all new states took title to the beds and banks of navi-
gable watercourses at statehood as a matter of implication, and
since the public trust applies to the same bodies of water, it is
logical to view the trust as an implied condition of statehood-a
key adjunct of Congress' general purpose of keeping those water-
courses "forever free." Congressional power to impose such a con-
dition, in implementing the commerce authority, is beyond ques-
tion."" This analysis, of course, would mean that the public trust
doctrine is not constitutionally mandated. Rather, it is accom-
plished by preemption, with congressional policy being effected
through the statehood acts and the many statutes governing navi-
gation.' The approach would be attractive to modern courts be-
cause preemption, rather than recognition of constitutional stan-
dards, is the preferred method of analysis in constitutional
adjudication.'3 6
Nevertheless, in the context of the law involving watercourses
navigable for title, with its special traditions and heavy overlay of
constitutional doctrine, locating the public trust doctrine in the
Constitution itself is perhaps more persuasive. The navigation
servitude, a limit on state authority on exactly the same water-
courses, is an implied component of the commerce clause. 3 ' The
134. See Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 229-30 (1844),
where the Court upheld Congress' power to include the "common highways, and
forever free" condition in a statehood act under the commerce power. In deter-
mining the validity of such a condition in the statehood act of Alabama, the Court
stated:
[a]s the provision of what is called the compact [that all navigable waters
within the said State shall forever remain public highways, free to the citi-
zens] between the United States and the state of Alabama does not, by the
above reasoning [from Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 (9 Wheat.) at 196], exceed the
power thereby conceded to Congress over the original states on the same
subject ....
This supposed compact is, therefore, nothing more than a regulation of
commerce, to that extent, among the several States ....
Id. at 230. See also United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121
(1985); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzen-
bach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
135. On the statehood acts and statutes governing navigation, see supra notes
50 and 131 respectively.
136. See generally Note, Preemption As a Preferential Ground: A New Ca-
non of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208 (1959).
137. See supra note 100 and text accompanying note 101. Several other con-
stitutional provisions augment the commerce clause and demonstrate the framers'
concern with free navigation. See supra note 53.
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navigation servitude and the public trust doctrine are parallel
doctrines, both affording complementary protections to major wa-
tercourses-the Court has recently, and correctly, described the
public trust as a "servitude."' 8 Similarly, the Court has found
that the extraordinary implied land transfer to the states upon
admission is guaranteed to the states under the Constitution by
the equal footing doctrine." 9 It follows that the trust, a "servi-
tude" 40 or "easement"' on the underlying land title, is also im-
posed by the same source, the Constitution. For more than 150
years, the Supreme Court has consistently given a constitutional
cast to state and federal prerogatives and obligations with regard
to waters navigable for title, due ultimately to the key role of
these watercourses in the country's commerce and society and in
the formation of the national government." 2 Thus, although the
other federal alternatives mentioned above have characteristics
that cut in their favor, the fairest and most principled conclusion
is that the public trust doctrine is rooted in the commerce clause
and became binding on new states at statehood.
The second unresolved question is whether the substantive
standards for administering the trust are defined by state or fed-
eral law. There are three possibilities. First, there is language in
7
138. See Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n, 466 U.S.
198, 206 (1984). The two doctrines are parallel and complementary because the
public trust doctrine prevents the substantial impairment of public rights in navi-
gable waterways, see supra text accompanying note 120, while the navigation ser-
vitude prevents the acquisition of compensable private interest in navigable wa-
terways, see supra note 100. Neither doctrine is truly indispensable, given
Congress' ability to exercise the eminent domain power in any event. Yet, given
implied state ownership, the most sensible reconciliation of federal and states'
rights under the Constitution recognizes both the public trust'servitude and the
navigation servitude as federal prerogatives encompassed by the commerce clause.
139. See supra note 9 & 97 on the constitutional stature of the states' land
title under the equal footing doctrine. The trust obligations passed with the land
title to the states upon statehood. See, e.g., Dunning, The Significance of Califor-
nia's Public Trust Easement for California Water Rights Law, 14 U.C. DAVIs L.
REV. 357, 363-67 (1980) (the public trust "springs from the ownership of land con-
ferred on the State of California upon admission to the United States.
140. See supra note 102.
141. Id.
142. For Chief Justice Marshall's view of the role of commerce, including nav-
igation, in forming the federal government, see text accompanying notes 53-57. On




both old and new cases suggesting that the content of the tradi-
tional trust is purely a matter of state law. Thus, for example, the
Supreme Court in the 1926 opinion in Appleby v. City of New
York"" stated that "the conclusion reached [in Illinois Central]
was necessarily a statement of Illinois law . . ,,.  United States
Supreme Court decisions during the 1980s have not addressed the
issue directly but have made repeated references to state preroga-
tives over lands navigable for title.""
A second, and opposite, conclusion is that the trust is defined
solely by federal law. Certainly this is the fairest reading of Illi-
nois Central."14 Although the opinion necessarily refers to the
state of Illinois occasionally, much of the opinion is written more
comprehensively with references to "a State"'" 7 and with phrases
that are plainly of general applicability, such as "[a]ny grant of
the kind is necessarily revocable . ". .. " Suggestions that trust
standards are established as a matter of federal law are also
found in many other court opinions." 9
My conclusion, however, is that there is a third approach
that provides a middle ground that is more sensitive to the many
different factors at work here. Both the implied transfer and the
overlying trust in favor of public access are now settled parts of
143. 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926) (state acts of dominion over submerged lands,
previously granted by City of New York in fee simple absolute to the plaintiffs'
testator, were an unconstitutional impairment of contracts under state law).
144. Id. The Appleby Court went on to note that "the general principle and
the exception [of Illinois Central] have been recognized the country over and have
been approved in several cases in the State of New York." Id. See also Lazarus,
supra note 3, at 638-40. The Appleby ruling contains an involved and comprehen-
sive analysis of New York state law and state court decisions, in contrast to the
very limited treatment of Illinois authority in Illinois Central. Compare Illinois
Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) with Appleby v. New York, 271 U.S. 364
(1926).
145. The most recent Supreme Court cases in this field are Phillips Petro-
leum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988); Utah Div. of State Lands v. United
States, 482 U.S. 193 (1987); Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands
Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198 (1984); Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & School
Lands, 461 U.S. 273 (1983); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979);
Vaughn v. Vermilion Corp., 444 U.S. 206 (1979). See infra notes 156-62 and ac-
companying text.
146. See 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
147. E.g., id. at 453.
148. Id. at 455. See generally note 119 and accompanying text.
149. See infra note 163.
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our jurisprudence. There are powerful state interests-powerful
enough to induce the implied transfer in the first place-and
strong national interests-strong enough to impress an implicit
trust on these highly valued natural resources. It does not make
sense that a state could abdicate a federally and constitutionally
imposed trust completely.8 0 As Justice Field put it in Illinois
Central, if there were no trust at all, such a situation "would
place every harbor in the country at the mercy of a majority of
the legislature of the State in which the harbor is situated. ' 151 At
the same time, there is plainly broad state discretion; Illinois
Central recognized the propriety both of state transfers consis-
tent with navigation and of nonnavigation-related transfers that
did not substantially impair the trust.152 Later cases have ap-
proved a variety of state transactions of trust lands. 53 Probably
the most satisfactory formulation is the standard, set out in Iii-
150. This thought is at the core of public trust law. As the Court stated in
Shively v. Bowlby:
Lands under tide waters are incapable of cultivation or improvement in
the manner of lands above high water mark. They are of great value to the
public for the purposes of commerce, navigation, and fishery. Their im-
provement by individuals, when permitted, is incidental or subordinate to
the public use and right. Therefore the title and the control of them are
vested in the sovereign for the benefit of the whole people.
152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894). Thus, while the states can relinquish title to trust lands,
[tihe control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost,
except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the pub-
lic therein, or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the
public interest in the lands and waters remaining.
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453.
Modern cases have recognized that state "control" for public trust purposes
exceeds the scope of state title over navigable waterways. Thus, in Marks v.
Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971), the California
Supreme Court held that submerged lands sold by the state for other than trust
purposes continue to be impressed with the public trust, despite their private
ownership. Such cases are entirely consistent with the "no substantial impair-
ment" rule of Illinois Central, and with modern treatment of the public trust, see
infra note 152 and accompanying text, since state title law is a separate issue.
151. 146 U.S. at 455, This language has been cited as suggesting that the
Court intended a national application of the Illinois Central rule. See Lazarus,
supra note 3, at 639 n.37.
152. See 146 U.S. at 453.
153. See, e.g., Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 732 P.2d 989 (1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988); Kootenai Envtl. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club,
105 Idaho 622, 671 P.2d 1085 (1983). See generally Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mis-
sissippi, 108 S. Ct. 791, 799 (1988).
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nois Central and reaffirmed in Shively v. Bowlby, that the states
have extensive leeway but that the purposes of the trust cannot
be "substantially impair[ed]."'" Professor Sax has explained the
basic legal rule this way,
[T]he Court [in Illinois Central] articulated a principle that has
become the central substantive thought in public trust litigation.
When a state holds a resource which is available for the free use of
the general public, a court will look with considerable skepticism
upon any governmental conduct which is calculated either to relo-
cate that resource to more restricted uses or to subject public uses
to the self-interest of private parties.'"5
To be sure, there is language in some cases suggesting that
states have unfettered discretion in administering the trust. The
most recent opinion, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,'
stated that "ownership of [public trust tidellands . . . is a ques-
tion of state law.' 5 7 Phillips, however, was only a dispute over
real property title to tidelands.'58 It did not involve the right of
the public to obtain access to the overlying waters, which is the
essence of the public trust doctrine. 59 Indeed, two other recent
154. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453; Shively, 152 U.S. at 47.
155. Sax, Judicial Intervention, supra note 3, at 490.
156. 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988).
157. Id. at 799 (1988). The Court also quoted from Shively v. Bowlby to the
same effect: "[Tihere is no universal and uniform law upon the subject; but ...
each state has dealt with the lands under the tide waters within its borders ac-
cording to its own views of justice and policy." Id. at 798.
158. See id. at 793 ("This is in the end a title suit." quoting, Cinque Bambini
Partnership v. Mississippi, 491 So. 2d 508, 510 (Miss. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Phil-
lips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988)). Shively v. Bowlby also
involved a title transfer. 152 U.S. 1 (1893).
159. Phillips also stated,
even where States have given dominion over tidelands to private property
owners, some States have retained for the general public the right to fish,
hunt, or bathe on these lands .... These long-established rights may be lost
with respect to nonnavigable tidal waters if we adopt the rule adopted by
petitioners [that the lands at issue were nonnavigable].
108 S. Ct. at 799. See also id. at 799 n.12. This language seems to suggest that
public access may depend on state law, but such a reading is inconclusive dictum
made in summary fashion without analysis of the Supreme Court opinions. Also,
such a reading is contrary both to Illinois Central and the assumption of the
Court in Kaiser Aetna and Vaughn in 1979, that federal law guarantees public
access to lands navigable for title. See infra note 162.
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Supreme Court cases, Kaiser Aetna v. United States'" and
Vaughn v. Vermilion Corp.161 were plainly premised on the idea
that the public has a right to use the surface of watercourses nav-
igable for title, regardless of relevant state law. 162 State court
opinions have also regularly operated on the assumption that
states are bound, as a matter of national law, to keep navigable
watercourses open to public use. 6 8 Neither the Supreme Court
160. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
161. 444 U.S. 206 (1979).
162. Both Kaiser Aetna and Vaughn ultimately held that the watercourses in
question were not navigable for title, but the Supreme Court assumed that the
public would have had access under federal law if the watercourses had been navi-
gable for title. Thus, in United States v. Kaiser Aetna, the court of appeals up-
held public access on the basis of navigability for title. 584 F.2d 378, 383-84 (9th
Cir. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). The Supreme Court seemed to accept the
government's position that "[tihe public thereby acquired a right to use Kuapa
Pond as a continuous highway for navigation..." if the pond had been navigable
for title. 444 U.S. at 170. The law of the State of Hawaii did not allow such public
access. 584 F.2d at 383-84.
The Supreme Court in Kaiser Aetna described the public right of access as
being guaranteed by the navigation servitude, not the public trust, but that char-
acterization seems wrong. The navigation servitude is a rule of noncompensation
(an exception to the requirement of fifth amendment compensation) when the
United States develops watercourses navigable for title. See supra note 100. The
public trust, on the other hand, has traditionally been used to protect the public's
right of access to navigable watercourses. In general, the opinions have not always
precisely distinguished among the three distinctive rules that apply to water-
courses navigable for title: (1) the states' right to ownership (with the federal gov-
ernment holding title, before statehood, in trust for the States); (2) the public
trust doctrine (with the state, after statehood, owing a trust obligation to the pub-
lic in order to assure access); and (3) the navigation servitude. Professor Huffman
discusses the distinction between state ownership and public access in Huffman,
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi: A Hidden Victory for Private Property?, 19
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,051, 10,055-56 (1988).
163. The state court opinions, like the federal cases, do not always state ex-
plicitly whether the trust standards are set as a matter of federal or state law.
Nevertheless, many state courts, citing Illinois Central, have treated its principle
of open public access to watercourses navigable for title as a rule of general appli-
cability. See, e.g., State ex rel. Rohrer v. Credle, 322 N.C. 522, 526, 369 S.E.2d
825, 827 (1988) ("Under the public trust doctrine, each state could regulate or
dispose of its tidal lands, provided that it could be done 'without substantial im-
pairment of the interest of the public in the waters.' "); CWC Fisheries, Inc. v.
Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1118 (Alaska 1988) ("Illinois Central remains the leading
case regarding public rights in tide and submerged lands conveyed by the state.");
Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 670, 732 P.2d 989, 994 (1987) (citing Illinois
Central as providing "[tihe test of whether or not an exercise of legislative power
with respect to tidelands and shorelands violates the 'public trust doctrine' ... ")
1989]
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
nor any state courts have disavowed the prohibition of "substan-
tial impairment" of public rights of navigation, commerce, and
fishing announced in Illinois Central and Shively v. Bowlby.
The standards for the trust, then, are best understood as
having very broad parameters set as a matter of federal mandate,
either by way of congressional preemption or constitutional law;
the constitutional rationale is more consonant with the whole
body of law. The traditional trust allows the states wide latitude,
but the states are federally prohibited from abrogating the public
trust entirely.
I do not wish to make too much of the fact that the most
principled analysis leads to the conclusion that the public trust
has minimum requirements set by the Constitution. The states
have such broad discretion to fashion their own individual bodies
of trust law that the constitutional standards will seldom be
called into play. This has proved to be the case in the litigation to
date. Thus, the main value of understanding the federal constitu-
tional source and scope of the trust probably does not lie in a
constitutional mandate that some presumptively valid uses must
be forgone. Rather, as the next section explores, the constitu-
tional dimensions of the traditional doctrine are perhaps most
useful in setting a context for state court and legislative decision-
making when fashioning public trust remedies under state law."6 4
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988); Kootenai Envtl. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht
Club, 105 Idaho 622, 625, 671 P.2d 1085, 1088 (1983) ("Illinois Central ... is the
seminal case on the scope of the public trust doctrine and remains the primary
authority today."). See also West Indian Co. v. Virgin Islands, 844 F.2d 1007, 1018
(3d Cir. 1988) (applying the law of the Virgin Islands, the case cites Illinois Cen-
tral as a "rule[] of the common law ... as generally understood and applied in the
United States.") cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 31 (1988). National Audubon Soc'y v.
Superior Court (Mono Lake) stated,
As we noted recently in City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, supra, 26 Cal.
3d 515, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, 606 P.2d 362, the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois, . . . "re-
mains the primary authority even today, almost nine decades after it was
decided."
33 Cal. 3d 419, 437, 658 P.2d 709, 721, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 358, cert. denied, 464
U.S. 977 (1983). For contrary authority, see Montana Coalition for Stream Access
v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 168 (Mont. 1984) (suggesting that the extensive public
access to Montana watercourses is mandated, not by federal law, but by Montana
state law, including the Montana Constitution), quoted infra note 165.
164. Thus, as with other constitutional doctrines, the federal constitution cre-
ates a set of minimum standards that can be expanded, but not contracted, by the
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VI. BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL DOCTRINE
Court decisions and legislation in most states have supple-
mented the traditional federal doctrine, and most of the remain-
ing states are likely to follow eventually. The developments have
been many, but the major developments are these. First, some
states have extended the coverage of the trust beyond those wa-
tercourses navigable for title to all, or nearly all, waters of the
state. A leading example is Montana,"" where the courts and leg-
islature have applied the public trust to all waters usable for rec-
reational purposes. Second, cases have extended the trust beyond
the traditional purposes of commerce, navigation, and fishing,
with the most common "new" purposes being various forms of
recreation. 6 ' Third, various cases have extended the reach be-
yond watercourses per se. 17 Thus, decisions and state constitu-
tions extend the trust to dry sand beaches,' wildlife,' and state
states. See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individ-
ual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977), where Justice Brennan discusses the
states' role in providing greater protection of individual rights and encourages
states to exceed federal constitutional standards by recognizing additional rights
at the state level. In the sphere of the public trust, many states have expanded the
basic federal guarantee in numerous respects. See infra notes 167-78 and accom-
panying text.
165. See Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171
(Mont. 1984) ("we hold that, under the public trust doctrine and the 1972 Mon-
tana Constitution, any surface waters that are capable of recreational use may be
so used by the public without regard to streambed ownership or navigability for
nonrecreational purposes."). The legislative stream access provisions are found in
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-311 to -322 (1988). For subsequent litigation in which
some provisions were struck down, see Galt v. Montana Dep't of Fish, Wildlife &
Parks, 731 P.2d 912 (Mont. 1987).
166. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259-60, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 98
Cal. Rptr. 790, 796 (1971) (trust purposes are far broader than traditional uses of
navigation, commerce, and fishing, and include use as open space and wildlife
habitat, and use for scientific purposes, hunting, bathing, and swimming); Orion
Corp. v. Washington, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 640-41, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 (1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1996 (1988) (public trust rights include navigation, fishing,
swimming, water skiing, and other related recreational purposes); Menzer v. Vil-
lage of Elkhart Lake, 51 Wis. 2d 70, 81, 186 N.W.2d 290, 296 (1971) (purposes of
trust include all public uses of water).
167. For a compilation of these cases, see Reed, The Public Trust Doctrine:
Is It Amphibious? 1 ENVTL. L. & LIT. 107, 116-21 (1986).
168. See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 471
A.2d 355 (1984).
169. See, e.g., Wade v. Kraemer, 121 Ill. App. 3d 377, 459 N.E.2d 1025 (1984).
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parks.1 0 One recent decision in New Jersey even extended the
trust to drinking water in a dispute over the distribution of pro-
ceeds from a water supply company.
171
Last, and the subject of this issue of Environmental Law, a
number of state courts have moved into the area of appropriation
of water. These courts hold or suggest that water rights obtained
under the prior appropriation doctrine might be curtailed if such
appropriations substantially impair watercourses navigable for ti-
tle. The Mono Lake17 2 case and the Bay Delta 17 case, both in
California, are the most notable opinions on this point. Variations
of this reasoning can be found in Idaho,""4 Alaska, 17 5 and North
Dakota. 
1 7
Other articles in this issue will explore specific instances in
which the traditional doctrine has been expanded, particularly in
the area of appropriation of water. I would like, however, to dis-
cuss one last foundational issue. That question is whether it is
appropriate for the judiciary to take such an active role in this
field, and whether the state and federal judiciary ought to remain
active in formulating the public trust doctrine.
The most articulate attack on the modern expansion of the
public trust doctrine is a major article by Richard J. Lazarus.177
Lazarus sharply criticizes what he believes to be unprincipled ju-
dicial activism:
[Tihe doctrine threatens to fuel a developing clash in liberal ideol-
170. See, e.g., Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 215
N.E.2d 114 (1966). For a case extending the trust to a national park, see Sierra
Club v. Department of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975). For a discus-
sion of the Redwood National Park cases, see Wilkinson, supra note 61, at 285-90.
171. Mayor & Mun. Council of Clifton v. Passaic Valley Water Comm'n, 224
N.J. Super. 53, 64, 539 A.2d 760, 765 (1987).
172. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court (Mono Lake), 33 Cal. 3d 419,
658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
173. United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d
82, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1986).
174. Shokal v. Dunn, 109 Idaho 330, 707 P.2d 441 (1985); Kootenai Envtl.
Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, 105 Idaho 622, 671 P.2d 1085 (1983).
175. CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1988).
176. United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation
Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976).
177. Lazarus, supra note 3. For another spirited attack on the public trust
doctrine, see Comment, The Public Trust Totem in Public Land Law: Ineffec-
tive-And Undesirable-Judicial Intervention, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 455 (1982).
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ogy between furthering individual rights of security and dignity,
bound up in notions of private property protection, and supporting
environmental protection and resource preservation goals, inevita-
bly dependent on intrusive governmental programs designed to
achieve longer-term collectivist goals....
The doctrine . . . unduly relies on a proenvironment judicial
bias.
178
Without necessarily referring to Mr. Lazarus, one must note
a considerable irony when one hears complaints against the pub-
lic trust doctrine, on the grounds of judicial activism, from those
who advocate rigid, absolute protection of rights granted under
state law and who advocate states' rights generally. Remember,
after all, the context in which the traditional trust doctrine arose.
The trust was necessary to complement the implied real estate
transfer that was so extraordinarily favorable to the states." 9 It is
discordant, therefore, to hear criticism of half a formula on the
basis of states' rights and judicial activism, when the other half of
the formula is pro-states' rights and demonstrably the product of
judicial activism.
But one must follow the criticism of the judiciary's role in
the development of the trust further. The issue of the judiciary's
legitimate role is fairly raised by the fact that most development
of the doctrine has come from the courts when we are plainly in a
time when the field of natural resources law and policy has be-
come heavily statutory."'0 Surely that characterizes western water
law. How can there be room for the substantial development of
judge-made doctrines?
178. Lazarus, supra note 3, at 633, 692.
179. See supra notes 75-97 and accompanying text.
180. This argument is forcefully advanced in Lazarus, supra note 3, at 675-
91. Lazarus continues:
The tremendous expansion in the nature of sovereign authority and the
degree of governmental oversight does more, however, than undercut any
meaningful role for the public trust doctrine in promoting governmental
authority. The implications of this expansion question the central premise
of the trust doctrine's origins-that the doctrine provides a needed legal
basis to ensure public accountability for governmental decisions that ad-




The leading discussion of this general topic is Professor
Guido Calabresi's book, A Common Law for the Age of Stat-
utes. s ' Calabresi assesses these issues with real care and, among
other things, finds a particularly appropriate judicial role when
cases involve constitutional interpretation or the interpretation of
archaic laws.' Similar themes resonate in the writings of some of
our greatest judges. Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote this in The
Common Law,
A very common phenomenon, and one very familiar to the stu-
dent of history, is this. The customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive
time establish a rule or a formula. In the course of centuries the
custom, belief, or necessity disappears, but the rule remains. The
reason which gave rise to the rule has been forgotten, and inge-
nious minds set themselves to inquire how it is to be accounted for.
... The old form receives a new content, and in time even the form
modifies itself to fit the [new] meaning which it has received. 8 '
181. G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982). Cala-
bresi focuses principally on some of the "disparate current legal-political phenom-
ena" that have arisen in reaction to the "orgy of statute making" which has oc-
curred in the past 50 to 80 years. Id. at 1. Calabresi suggests,
[t]hese phenomena include events as diverse as: the increasing tendency of
courts to find that constitutions, and especially notions of equal protection,
require the invalidation of statutes; the development of "passive-virtue"
theories .... which would enable courts to force legislatures to take a sec-
ond look at constitutionally doubtful statutes; . . . the delegation of sub-
stantial authority in lawmaking to administrative agencies; [and] the pres-
sure for sunset laws ....
Id.
182. See id. at 8, 91. Calabresi suggests that judges are especially well quali-
fied to address a key problem caused by this flood of statute making-the problem
he calls "legal obsolescence." Id. at 2. He argues that because courts are selected
for their capacity to discern principles of law and to act rationally on them,
"courts are better than other institutions at discerning principles of law and at
working out the demands of the ever changing legal topography." Id. at 96. Fur-
ther, "the way judges are trained and selected, their relative independence, the
limitations imposed on their staff, the fact that they make law incrementally in
response to specific situations, and the requirement that they explain the grounds
of their decisions, all seem designed to lead them to perform . . ." the job of mak-
ing the conditional rules of society and, "at common law at least, set[ting] the
starting points for legislative reaction." Id.
Calabresi's own conclusion is that "there is nothing in democratic or
majoritarian theory which supports the notion that old statutes, as a group, are
more entitled to a conservative bias than old common law rules .... Id. at 103.
183. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (1881).
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Jerome Frank said:
New instruments of production, new modes of travel and of dwell-
ing, new credit and ownership devices, new concentrations of capi-
tal, new social customs, habits, aims and ideals-all these factors of
innovation make vain the hope that definitive legal rules can be
drafted that will forever after solve all legal problems .... Our soci-
ety would be strait-jacketed were not the courts, with the able as-
sistance of the lawyers, constantly overhauling the law and adapt-
ing it to the realities of ever-changing social, industrial and
political conditions .... "'
Such assessments of the role of the judiciary fit the public
trust doctrine, particularly in the area of the appropriation of
water. First, the public trust doctrine has strong constitutional
overtones and thus, in significant part, courts are engaging in
state or federal constitutional adjudication, where the role of the
courts traditionally is the broadest.185 Second, although western
water law has been modernized in some respects, prior appropria-
tion presents a classic example of how the passage of time and a
changed social consciousness can make legal rules archaic. The
"first in time, first in right" rule, developed as a matter of judge-
made common law,186 is a rule of capture, a blunt instrument, one
of the most primitive forms of property ownership. Originally the
law of prior appropriation grew up from and conformed itself per-
fectly to the society it was expected to serve, just as good law
should. But the time has long passed when prior appropriation
met all of the calls of western states.
1 8 7
Prior appropriation was cemented in place, in its mid-nine-
teenth century form, by state water agencies. They were
chartered at the behest of water interests at the turn of the cen-
tury for the twin purposes of protecting existing appropriative
rights and creating a sense of order. The United States insisted
184. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 6-7 (1930).
185. This tradition derives from Marbury v. Madison, where Chief Justice
Marshall declared, in the context of constitutional adjudication, "[it is emphati-
cally the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.
Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and inter-
pret that rule." 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
186. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855). See supra note 107 and accompany-
ing text.
187. For one of the many recent calls for reform of western water law and
policy, see M. REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT (1986).
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upon this as a requisite for the big reclamation projects so cher-
ished by western water developers. From the beginning, these
were captured agencies in the fullest sense: publicly-funded bod-
ies whose mission was to protect and promote a limited class of
private rights. Despite improvements in western water adminis-
tration during the last decade or so, the interests that created the
agencies in the first place, and served as the agencies' sole constit-
uency, had already locked in well over a century of private uses."8
One can sense that modern courts find in the extreme
reaches of prior appropriation, both in its substance and its ad-
ministration, a one-dimensional rule of law, founded in another
time, that is ill-suited for this age. Faced with overriding natural
resource calamities, such as the massive drawing-down of a major
lake,' 80 the relentless salt water intrusion into one of our great
deltas,' 0 or the drying up of a whole river, the courts understand-
ably respond to a doctrine that can, in a principled way, provide
balance. That is precisely how the traditional doctrine arose in
the first place, with the dedication of far too much of Chicago
harbor to the private interests."" Then, as now, judges can be ex-
pected to employ old and honored notions of trusteeship in order
to fulfill the interests and the expectations of the public.'
188. See generally Wilkinson, Aldo Leopold and Western Water Law:
Thinking Perpendicular to the Prior Appropriation Doctrine, XXIV LAND &
WATER L. REV. 1, 2-12 (1988).
189. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court (Mono Lake), 33 Cal. 3d 419,
658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
190. United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d
82, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1986).
191. See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 454 (1892).
192. In an excellent piece on the philosophical and customary origins of the
public trust doctrine, Professor Sax asserts that "[tihe central idea of the public
trust is preventing the destabilizing disappointment of expectations held in com-
mon but without formal recognition such as title." Sax, Liberating, supra note 5,
at 188. Sax argues that judges
can assure that decisions made by mere administrative bodies are not al-
lowed to impair trust interests in the absence of explicit, fully considered
legislative judgments .... [Tihe courts can reduce the pressures that claims
of private ownership put on public trust resources by looking to the history
of common rights. The courts should recognize that mere unutilized title,
however ancient, does not generate the sort of expectations central to the
justness of property claims, and that long-standing public uses have an im-
portant place in the analysis.
Id. at 194. Professor Sax had earlier alluded to the proper role of the courts, in
stating,
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VII. CONCLUSION
The public trust, as it is applied to the appropriation of
water, is based on a set of modest beliefs: a belief that the public
benefits mightily from private development, but that the public
interest is in fact greater than the sum of the private interests; a
belief that property ownership must be profoundly respected but
that property rights in water, like rights in land, are not absolute
but rather can be regulated and adjusted in reasonable ways for
the good of the citizenry as a whole; ' a belief that wasteful uses
of public resources are wrong and are not excused by return flows
that return to our rivers not just water but also silt, salts,
agrichemicals, and temperature changes;"" a belief that our rivers
and canyons are more than commodities, that they have a trace of
Illinois Central also raises more far-reaching issues. For example, what are
the implications for the workings of the democratic process when such pro-
grams, although ultimately found to be unjustifiable, are nonetheless
promulgated through democratic institutions? Furthermore, what does the
existence of those seeming imperfections in the democratic process imply
about the role of the courts, which, Illinois Central notwithstanding, are
generally reluctant to hold invalid the acts of co-equal branches of
government?
Sax, Judicial Intervention, supra note 3, at 491.
193. Of course, the constitutional validity of land use planning has long been
established. For recent Supreme Court treatment of the issue, see, e.g., Pennell v.
City of San Jose, 108 S. Ct. 849 (1988); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los An-
geles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480
U.S. 572 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470
(1987). Professor Sax has noted that "[l]and-use regulation, whether effectuated
by private covenant or by public zoning, reflects a recognition of values common
to the community. The regulation most often is a joint effort to protect values
diffused among all property owners within the regulated area." Sax, Liberating,
supra note 5, at 188 n.12. See generally Sagoff, On Preserving the Natural Envi-
ronment, 84 YALE L.J. 205, 267 (1974) ("[Niothing is sacred; everything changes.
It is just that changes which inhibit us from sharing our common heritage should
not come at the whim of the developer. Nor should they depend on the conflicting
interests of outdoors-people who like to hike and swim. Far different issues are at
stake. They go to our sense of ourselves as a national community.").
194. On the increasing seriousness of, and growing costs associated with,
water quality problems (including discussion of ground and surface water, point-
and non-point source pollution), see, e.g., THE CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, STATE
OF THE ENVIRONMENT: AN ASSESSMENT AT MID-DECADE 105-28 (1984). See also THE
CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, AMERICA'S WATER: CURRENT TRENDS AND EMERGING IS-
SUES 42-53 (1984).
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the sacred; a belief that words like "trust" ought to be taken
seriously.
The public trust is one doctrine, one idea, in a historic reform
movement that, slowly but steadily, is reshaping water law and
policy in the West. The trust, however, has a special place in that
movement because of its ancient roots, because of the context in
which it was first announced in this country, because of the dy-
namic way in which it has been applied to a whole range of re-
source controversies, and because of the intangible way in which
it evokes a sense of dignity and calls out the best and highest in
us as a people. The trust, whether invoked by courts or legisla-
tures, can play a principled part in structuring a system that re-
ally does reflect the vitality, diversity, and sacredness of both our
ever-changing society and our inspiring, magnificent river
systems.
